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Abstract 
The UKERC Systems Theme has played an important role in the development 
of the UK’s capacity to think systematically about the future of the energy 
system. Key tools in this process have been the development of scenarios, 
and the development and use of the MARKAL energy system model. This 
project reflects on scenarios and on the use and communication of MARKAL, 
with a view to informing future UKERC work. Specifically, the project 
conducted retrospective analysis of pre-UKERC energy scenarios for the UK 
(published from 1977-2002), examined the scenarios produced by the UKERC 
systems theme, and studied the use and communication of the UK MARKAL 
model.  
The diversity of scenario methods and approaches developed within UKERC is 
valuable, and should be fostered further. Too narrow a range of techniques 
and teams developing scenarios would risk constraining the ability of UKERC 
to open up thinking to a wide range of possibilities, perspectives and 
framings, which history suggests is important.  UKERC scenarios have tended 
to be dominated by futures in which mitigation goals are met, and in which 
scenario differences are driven by policy or technology, though there are of 
course exceptions. As UKERC Phase 3 begins, there is a case for reflecting 
further on the range and type of uncertainties addressed within energy 
system scenarios, and the diversity of tools and techniques used to generate 
them.  
A core tool of the UKERC systems theme has been the UK MARKAL model. The 
research undertaken for this project indicates that MARKAL has generally 
been used and communicated appropriately, in part because of good working 
relationships between government analysts and UKERC researchers. There are 
also areas in which there is room for improvement, and UKERC Phase 3 
provides an opportunity to learn the lessons from previous experience. 
  
iv 
 
UK Energy Research Centre                                                                UKERC/WP/ESY/2014/002 
 
Executive Summary 
UKERC has made extensive use of scenarios and scenario modelling, and has 
played an important role in the growth of the UK’s energy scenarios and 
energy system modelling capacity. This project was established at the end of 
UKERC Phase 2 to reflect on the way in which scenarios have been produced, 
used and communicated. The project aimed to reflect on some key issues in 
scenario construction and use, while also providing insights for future 
scenario work within UKERC Phase 3.  
The policy relevance of scenario approaches for exploring the future, and 
their usefulness for addressing real-world questions, is a fundamental part of 
their rationale and appeal. Yet the relationship between the development and 
choice of energy scenarios on the one hand, and the dynamics of the real 
world on the other, is not always clear. This raises a number of fundamental 
questions - how should scenario developers and users use the scenario tools 
and scenarios themselves? How are they being used and interpreted in 
practice? And how are they communicated? There is value in reflecting on the 
way in which scenario techniques and scenarios developed by UKERC have 
been used in practice, whether this is appropriate given the strengths and 
weaknesses of the tools, and the ways in which future use can ensure it is 
providing quality evidence and communicating that evidence in a way that is 
of greatest value. This study provides a first assessment of these issues.  
Rather than a narrow focus on a single research question this report scopes 
key issues, and provides some overall high-level messages intended to 
provide a reflection on past practice and some suggestions for improvements. 
Specifically, we have organised our work around development, choice, 
interpretation, use and communication of energy scenarios and tools to 
construct them, primarily energy system models, UK MARKAL in particular.  
We draw insights from two research activities: firstly, a retrospective 
examination of past UK energy scenarios 1978-2002 and a comparison with 
more recent UKERC Phase 1 and 2 scenarios; and secondly, an analysis of the 
communication and use of a particular scenario tool, UK MARKAL, based on 
analysis of key texts and structured interviews with scenario developers, 
other UKERC researchers and civil servant ‘users’ of scenarios. 
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Key insights from the past UK energy scenario exercises (1978-2002) and 
their comparison with UKERC scenarios 
Scenarios have been a widely used analytic framing approach within the 
UKERC Energy Systems Theme.  Three quarters of reports produced within 
this theme include some scenario analysis, suggesting that this is the single 
most important approach within UKERC for considering long-term 
uncertainties. Examination of historical scenarios generates cautionary 
insights for today’s scenario approaches. In this project, a systematic search 
and retrospective analysis of the past UK energy scenarios was conducted. 
This overview covered twelve scenario exercises, starting from the very first 
UK energy scenarios by the UK Department of Energy in 1978 to the Energy 
Review of the Government in 2002. The reviewed scenarios were developed 
by research, governmental and non-governmental organisations as well as 
independent expert panels. The energy system transition depicted in the 
scenarios reached two to five decades ahead and thus can be assessed 
retrospectively. In light of the insights from the past UK energy scenarios, 
UKERC Phase 2 Energy Systems Theme scenarios from 1990-2013 were also 
examined. 
One of the most striking findings from the analysis of historical scenarios is 
that actual historical developments frequently turned out to lie outside the 
ranges of the depicted scenarios. It should not be surprising that any 
individual historical scenario turned out to be ‘incorrect’ in the sense that the 
future turned out to be different (since few scenario exercises aim to 
‘predict’), but if the value of scenarios is to help map the uncertainties, it is 
striking when a scenario set fails to bound the resulting future. A useful 
observation is that the richest and broadest picture of uncertainty emerged 
when insights from multiple scenario studies by different organisations were 
combined. This suggests that the UKERC approach, in which a variety of 
teams have developed scenarios using different approaches, is a sensible 
one. Too great an emphasis on consistency across methods and approaches 
to thinking about the future potentially risks generating a mistaken focus on 
a narrow range of uncertainties and possible futures.  
A further implication of historical ‘misses’ in scenarios is that expert 
judgements about the plausibility or implausibility of particular future 
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developments should be made with humility. History indicates that 
developments considered too unlikely to be worth considering can and do 
materialise. Scenarios are a tool that can enable consideration of such 
futures, and future UKERC work should be willing to engage with futures that 
challenge conventional wisdom about what is likely or plausible.  
While the historical scenarios varied in their accuracy in depicting (and 
bounding) future outcomes, it is notable that the scenarios mirrored the 
biggest concerns at that time: oil prices, nuclear power and more recently 
climate change. The forces that turned out to be most important and 
unexpected in driving energy systems change were not always captured, 
particularly ‘softer’ aspects such as institutional or governance changes. 
Scenarios in the 1980s focused largely on oil prices, rates of growth, and 
prospects for nuclear power. They tended not to explore institutional and 
structural developments in the wider economy. As is well known, it turned out 
to be exactly such institutional and structural changes (i.e. liberalisation of 
the economy and energy sector, and the decline of heavy industries) that 
were the dominating forces of energy system change during the 1990s. It 
remains unclear whether these developments were considered by the scenario 
developers as irrelevant for energy scenarios or whether there were no 
techniques and approaches available to capture these ‘softer’ aspects. In any 
case, the historical experience suggests value in reflecting on the range and 
type of uncertainties addressed within energy system scenarios, and 
including a wider range of scenario variables with greater attention to 
institutional, political and governance aspects.  
UKERC scenarios have examined a wide array of possible developments, 
including various behavioural, technological, economic, and policy 
uncertainties. The great majority have focused on ambitious mitigation 
scenarios, reflecting contemporary concerns around climate change, much as 
scenarios during the 1980s focused on oil prices and growth. Many UKERC 
scenarios have examined policies (both instruments and targets), or other 
developments that might a priori be expected to have an impact on 
decarbonisation (such as various aspects of behaviour change). The focus on 
mitigation is a core part of the UKERC research agenda, yet restricting the 
range of scenarios considered may obscure possibilities whose implications 
for mitigation and other energy system objectives need to be considered. 
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There may be a case for examining the implications of scenarios in which 
mitigation policy and low carbon transitions turn out to be more challenging 
than least-cost low-carbon pathways appear to suggest, and considering a 
wider set of drivers of energy system evolution (i.e. including drivers that are 
less directly related to mitigation). There may also be value in extending 
scenario processes to include a broader diversity of perspectives, through 
greater participatory engagement.  
Finally, the historical analysis also demonstrates that scenarios can be an 
effective mechanism for opening up dialogue about energy system priorities 
and possibilities. The scenarios developed to challenge the government’s 
established thinking in the late 1970s and early 1980s were effective at 
creating a plausible and compelling alternative, resulting in a re-
consideration of policy priorities and possible futures. This is an important 
point: scenarios produced by a diverse range of stakeholders and experts 
(including UKERC) provide a space for articulating and contesting energy 
system goals and choices, and are thus an important part of a process of 
energy system governance.  
Use and communication of UK MARKAL 
This part of the study focused on a particular tool developed by UKERC to 
generate and explore energy system scenarios, the UK MARKAL model. The 
study conducted 17 interviews with UKERC modellers, other UKERC 
researchers, and civil servants and reviewed 27 documents (UKERC reports, 
MARKAL reports commissioned by government, journal papers, and 
government publications). The analysis focused on the way in which the 
model has been communicated and used, drawing on the literature on the 
use of system models in policy to identify and explore key issues. 
There was general agreement among interviewees on the value of using the 
model, and this agreement was reflected in the texts. MARKAL is seen as 
being useful for deriving broad insights about possible energy system 
dynamics, rather than predictions. In particular, it is understood to be 
particularly suited to achieving insights into the feasibility of meeting targets, 
and key sectoral interactions within the energy system that other analytic 
approaches might overlook. There was a perception that MARKAL has 
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generally been appropriately used and understood, though civil servants 
acknowledged that it has sometimes been used to provide post-hoc 
justification for decisions taken for other reasons.  
Overall, use and communication of the purpose of the model in the UK 
appears to have been appropriate. One reason for this has been the 
establishment of good working relationships between UKERC systems theme 
modellers and analysts within government. The result of these relationships 
is that a simple flow of ‘insights’ from UKERC to ‘policymakers’ is an 
inaccurate description of the flows of information and knowledge. Analysts in 
government work closely with academic modellers, and are arguably more 
similar in role and outlook to academic modellers than they are to civil 
servants working in policy teams. Communication between modellers and this 
community of analysts is generally very good, and it is the analysts who 
mediate the flow of much model-based information through to policy teams. 
These analysts become ‘intelligent consumers’, who are able to perform the 
task of translating insights into a form that is relevant for policy teams. This 
has implications for efforts to produce scenarios that aim to ‘inform 
policymakers’ that are not co-produced with these analysts. For example, 
none of the civil servants with whom we spoke had read the UKERC 2013 
scenarios report, which had aimed to inform policymakers. While it is clear 
that such reports do contribute to the wider policy debate, their development 
needs to be carefully considered if they are to have a more direct impact on 
policy. Policy impact is more likely where scenarios focus on a specific policy 
process (such as a consultation, strategy process or enquiry), or where they 
are accompanied by efforts on the part of UKERC researchers to understand 
the needs of policy teams and policy advisory bodies.   
The analysis also identified a number of ongoing challenges around the use 
and communication of model results, and highlights three key ways in which 
analysis within UKERC 3 can aspire to do better: uncertainty, transparency 
and communication.  
Uncertainty. Modellers and scenario users alike recognise the great 
challenges of grappling with the scope of uncertainty in developing insights 
about possible futures. There is recognition that this is difficult, and that 
there are no easy ways to deal with uncertainty effectively. However, there is 
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also a sense that UKERC scenarios and modelling work could deal with 
uncertainty better than has been the case in the past. This has three facets: 
firstly, the scale of uncertainty presented is not always clear; there was a 
sense that the MARKAL work has, as a whole, tended to be viewed as 
presenting a picture of less uncertainty than we all truly believe to be ‘out 
there’. Secondly, a more systematic approach to characterising the sensitivity 
of the model to parameter uncertainty was suggested. In particular, there was 
thought to be a need for global sensitivity analysis, identifying the 
parameters to which key outputs were most sensitive. Finally, there is a risk 
with the dominant approach to scenarios, which can over-emphasise a single 
baseline and ‘core low carbon’ scenarios; this carries a risk that these are 
perceived to be implicitly endorsed as the ‘most likely’ scenarios.  
A general recommendation is to give more thought to how top-level 
uncertainty messages are communicated, particularly in executive summaries 
and conclusion sections. Text analysis revealed an over-emphasis on 
parameter uncertainties rather than model uncertainties, and on a relatively 
narrow range of parameters. 
Transparency.  Interviews revealed a nuanced picture of transparency, 
wherein it was recognised that transparency to different audiences can be 
achieved in different ways and to differing degrees. Many interviewees 
recognised trade-offs between efforts to foster greater transparency, such as 
through more detailed and up-to-date public documentation, and time spent 
improving and running the model itself. It was generally agreed that several 
key assumptions had remained rather poorly documented, such as share 
constraints and hurdle rates. The civil servants interviewed suggested that 
MARKAL has not always been seen as transparent within government. A 
common perception is that MARKAL was unnecessarily complex and that this 
hindered transparency, notwithstanding efforts to document assumptions. 
There are clearly opportunities to improve transparency with the development 
of UK TIMES; for example, through closer sharing of the model with DECC, 
publication of underlying spreadsheets and the use of more intuitive units. 
Communication. In general, good practice is followed in terms of providing 
appropriate contextual and qualifying information alongside headline 
messages. However, a few specific issues emerged that could be better 
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handled in future. Firstly, it was noted that texts sometimes highlight 
limitations or caveats, without guidance to readers on how to interpret them 
(e.g. saying “care must be taken” without indicating what this means). 
Evidence suggests that ambiguous information of this kind is typically either 
ignored or used as a reason to discredit and reject the findings as unreliable, 
depending on whether the results confirm the reader’s preconceptions. 
Secondly, while texts were not seen as being inappropriately jargon-heavy, 
there were instances of jargon in parts of documents that should ideally be 
jargon-free (i.e. executive summary and conclusion sections). Finally, several 
interviewees felt that quantitative information is frequently provided to too 
great a degree of precision, which can lead to an impression of accuracy or 
certainty.  
Conclusions and insights for UKERC Phase 3 
The project has provided a reflection on the use of scenario methods across 
the UKERC systems theme, and a particular focus on the use of a core UKERC 
tool, the MARKAL model. The project has highlighted many strengths of the 
UKERC approach and, as UKERC enters Phase 3, it offers suggestions on how 
to improve on the development, use and communication of scenarios.  
The diversity and range of methods and approaches developed within UKERC 
is valuable, and should be fostered further. Too narrow a range of techniques 
and teams developing scenarios would risk constraining the ability of UKERC 
to open up thinking to a wide range of possibilities, which history suggests is 
important.  UKERC scenarios have tended to be dominated by futures in 
which not only are climate targets the bedrock around which other 
sensitivities are assessed, but in which mitigation goals are also fully met, 
and scenario differences are mainly driven by policy or technology (there are 
of course exceptions). There is a case for reflecting further on the range and 
type of uncertainties addressed within energy system scenarios, and the tools 
and techniques used to generate them. Future work might usefully include 
examination of scenarios in which mitigation goals are not met or only 
partially met, as well as greater attention to social, political and institutional 
uncertainties alongside technology and policy. 
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A core tool of the UKERC systems theme has been the UK MARKAL model. The 
research undertaken for this project indicates that MARKAL has generally 
been used and communicated appropriately, in part because of good working 
relationships between government analysts and UKERC researchers. There are 
also areas in which there is room for improvement, and UKERC Phase 3 
provides an opportunity to learn the lessons from previous experience.   
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1.  Introduction 
There is a wide range of methods for exploring long-term energy futures, and 
debates about their use in policy have a long history. This project examines past 
use of scenarios and long-term system modelling in the UK (1978-2002) and within 
the UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC). Since it was established in 2004, UKERC 
has been a particularly active contributor to such debates, as its whole system 
approach and interdisciplinary approach is especially suitable for assessing 
transitions to sustainable energy futures. 
This project originates from the “Energy Systems” research theme of UKERC, a 
theme that has been very active in scenario work and is essentially the most 
“system focused” research theme within a system focused research organisation. 
Much of the research within this theme uses scenarios and models to construct 
these scenarios, but fairly little research has gone in understanding how scenarios 
are constructed and chosen or how the model based results are communicated to 
and interpreted by the end users. The policy relevance of scenarios and system 
models, and their usefulness for addressing real-world questions, is a fundamental 
part of their rationale and appeal. Yet the relationship between the methods and 
resulting scenarios on the one hand, and the dynamics of the real world on the 
other, is not always clear. How should such scenarios and tools be used? How are 
they being used in practice? The nature of the knowledge claims, and the 
confidence that can be placed in them, is not straightforward. There is value in 
reflecting on the way in which scenarios and tools of this kind developed by UKERC 
have been used in practice, whether this is appropriate given the strengths and 
weaknesses of the tools and resulting scenarios, and the ways in which future use 
can ensure it is providing quality evidence and communicating that evidence in a 
way that is of greatest value.  
The project has addressed these issues through two perspectives. The first has 
focused on scenarios and scenario choice. This work examined historical UK energy 
scenarios (1978-2002), as well as more recent UKERC Energy Systems Theme 
scenarios (2009-2013), thus also providing a synthesis element to the research.  
The results of these assessments are reported in Sections 3 and 4. The second 
perspective has focused on the use of a particular systems model, MARKAL, that 
has been widely used within UKERC. The team analysed documents and conducted 
interviews to draw conclusions about the way in which MARKAL has been used and 
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communicated. This work is described in Section 5. Overall conclusions and insights 
arising from both streams of work are discussed in Section 6. 
1.1 From forecasts to scenarios: multiple purposes of futures work 
There has been a trend, over the course of the past several decades, to shift away 
from modes of analysis that purport to predict the future towards weaker 
knowledge claims: exploring possible futures through ‘scenarios’. This is perhaps 
best illustrated by the relative frequency with which the terms ‘forecast’ and 
‘scenario’ have appeared in English publications over the past century. Such a shift 
in terminology is also observed in the ex-post analysis of past UK energy scenarios 
(see Section 3). 
 
Figure 1. Use of "forecast" and "scenario" in a large sample of books published in 
English. Figure shows frequency of use of each word as a percentage of all words 
used in all English language books. Source: Google NGram Viewer.  
There is a tendency to take for granted the idea that scenarios and model results 
provide an evidence base that can be used by policymakers to inform decisions. 
However, it is not always clear what this evidence base aims to provide, and how it 
aims to help inform decisions. Furthermore, the use of analytic tools such as 
scenarios and models to actually inform better decisions is only one approach to 
the use of analytic knowledge in policymaking (Hertin et al., 2009). A second 
rationale for futures analysis is political, for example, using analysis to support a 
decision taken for other reasons (Craig et al., 2002; Hertin et al., 2009), conducting 
analysis as a way of avoiding taking action, or using visions and scenarios to 
galvanise action in the present (McDowall, 2012). A additional rationale is 
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normative: policy actors use analytic tools and evidence because it is recognised to 
be the right way to make a decision, even if it is not clear that the analysis actually 
informs the decision. 
The literature on the use of evidence to inform policy highlights that evidence and 
knowledge is used in a variety of ways within the policymaking environment, 
beyond directly informing concrete decisions. Conceptual learning, which occurs 
when evidence ‘enlightens’ policymakers by challenging preconceptions or 
providing new ideas or perspectives, is also recognised as an important role for 
evidence in the policy process (Hertin et al., 2009), and may be a particularly 
relevant category of knowledge ‘use’ in the context of long-term futures.  
A variety of substantive rationales – aiming to inform decisions or foster conceptual 
learning - exist for conducting formal futures exercises: 
1. Best estimates of what is expected. This may or may not come with a set of 
uncertainties elaborated around it. A weaker form of this might be an 
attempt to bound the range of possibilities.  
2. “What if” analysis – predictions given a known ‘antecedent’, or predictions of 
the impact of a given action or event (what will be the effects of policy x; 
what would happen if there was a rise in y). This might be framed in more or 
less ‘predictive’ language – i.e. “what might happen” – aiming to draw out a 
plausible but not certain implication of a particular event or parameter 
change. This can be combined with attempts to elicit tacit beliefs and 
expectations from stakeholders, to draw out possible implications of 
different possible futures.  
3. Illustrate or test possibility/impossibility, difficulty/ease of reaching 
particular goals or particular futures. This may include providing a sequence 
of steps/elaborate necessary actions to reach a goal. 
4. Opening up thinking to options and/or issues that are thought to be ‘hidden’ 
by mainstream and/or dominant views; including attempts to open up 
thinking to possible ‘shocks’ (Van Notten et al., 2004; Volkery and Ribeiro, 
2009). This includes various participatory attempts to confront different 
stakeholder expectations. It can also include efforts to use futures exercises 
to create space for dialogue about priorities and perspectives: what should 
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be done, what should we aim for? Who should be involved? How should we 
decide? 
5. Improve thinking. A number of scenario and modelling exercises argue that 
they have a cognitive benefit, in that they improve the way that people think 
about the future (e.g. (Chermack, 2004; Craig et al., 2002; DeCarolis et al., 
2012). 
These are, of course, not mutually exclusive. Scenario and model exercises may 
have several of these aims concurrently. This multiplicity of possible aims for 
scenarios work makes clear that such analysis should not be evaluated simply on 
the basis of whether or not the depicted futures ‘came true’. Rather, such processes 
should be evaluated against their aims, and the processes through which they 
operated.  
1.2 Cognitive biases and implications for development, use and communication of 
scenarios 
A common claim for futures approaches is that they aim to help people to think 
about the future (Chermack, 2004; Craig et al., 2002). Such claims are difficult to 
empirically verify, and while a small literature examining the cognitive benefits of 
scenario planning is emerging (e.g. (Meissner and Wulf, 2013), the scenario and 
modelling literature has tended to accept or believe in such claims at face value. 
Part of the difficulty has been a lack of clarity about what is meant by ‘helping 
people to think’. Cognitive psychology provides some insights of relevance here by 
identifying various cognitive biases and heuristics. Understanding these biases and 
heuristics helps to inform how and whether particular types of talking and thinking 
about the future might help improve judgements by policymakers and others 
concerned with the future of energy systems.  
A summary of relevant heuristics and biases is provided below, drawing on 
Kloprogge et al. (2007) and Morgan and Keith (2008). Each is discussed briefly in 
turn, with some reflections on what this might mean for the communication and use 
of UKERC long-term systems analysis.  
Availability heuristic. People think something is more likely or more important if it 
is easily brought to mind. The implication is that simply talking or writing about 
something makes people think that it is more likely than if it had not been 
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discussed. In terms of UKERC work, this has implications for the uncertainties we 
focus on. If scenarios repeatedly examine similar uncertainties, these will be those 
that people think are most important because they will be most easily brought to 
mind. This is problematic if uncertainties of potentially greater importance are 
neglected - perhaps because they are not tractable in the model paradigm. It also 
reinforces the value of conducting a full global sensitivity analysis, and identifying 
those parameters to which model outcomes are most sensitive. Such sensitivity 
analyses will be important in preventing cognitive fixation on parameters that may 
or may not be those that are most important.  
Confirmation bias. People will fit evidence to their existing beliefs. So “Ambiguous 
data may be interpreted as a confirmation” (Kloprogge et al., 2007: p. 12). The 
implication is that caveats that are rather ambiguous or open, such as “care should 
be taken in interpreting these results”, are open to being either: completely ignored 
by those who think the findings are sound; or, seized on by those who disagree 
with the findings to discredit the results completely. Clearly it is impossible to avoid 
confirmation bias, but clarity helps reduce the interpretive flexibility of statements, 
and thus reduces the opportunity for biased interpretation.  
Overconfidence bias. People typically have too much faith in their own judgements. 
The implication of this is that people are less good at ‘intuitively’ judging the 
plausibility of energy system events than we think we are; and ‘expert judgement’ 
used in modelling is less expert than we might hope. Also when we say things like 
‘these uncertainties are unlikely to change the results presented here’, we should be 
aware that we are likely to be overstating the case. 
Framing bias. The way in which information is presented influences how it is 
understood. This is important for how one presents uncertainty information, in 
terms of whether it is presented as “a marginal note or as essential policy relevant 
information” (Kloprogge et al., 2007: p. 13). Caveats in footnotes, for example, will 
be seen as less important simply because they are in footnotes.  
Conjunction fallacy. People routinely believe an event to be more likely when it is 
described as part of a wider set of events, even when the conjunction of events is 
logically less likely than any one of the events occurring independently. This has 
been described at length by (Morgan and Keith, 2008) in the context of scenarios. 
They argue that a risk with detailed narrative scenarios is that they will tend to be 
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thought to be more likely than they really are, by virtue of the detail in which they 
are described.  
A further point, derived from empirical studies of uncertainty communication, is 
that people tend to conflate the reliability of an estimate and the degree of 
uncertainty in an estimate (Kloprogge et al., 2007).  For example, if you say that the 
model suggests that x is ‘very likely’, people think that this is a more reliable 
finding than if the model had said that x is ‘quite likely’. Yet in fact the same model 
has produced these findings, and the reliability of the estimate is unchanged – only 
the probability reported has changed. 
  
21 
 
104 
 
2.  Lessons from past UK scenarios, 1978-2002 
In this section we aim to gather insights into the development, choice, use and 
communication of energy scenarios from the ex-post analysis of past UK energy 
scenarios. Energy scenarios have been used in the UK since 1970s. These early 
scenarios, which were pioneering approaches at that time, explored the potential 
UK energy system transition 25 to 40 years ahead. The ambition and challenges 
faced by the developers of these scenarios are relevant to the UKERC Energy 
Systems Theme members, who also aspire to construct scenarios for energy system 
developments from today to 2050 and beyond. A range of advanced energy systems 
modelling and scenario approaches exist today and thus it could be expected that 
today’s energy scenarios are more thought-out because they build on experience 
accumulated through decades of long-term energy scenario development. Yet, 
analysis of past scenarios offers a valuable opportunity to assess projected scenario 
trends and their drivers, since past scenarios can be compared with the actual 
development of the energy system, as well as institutional, societal, international 
and other developments. Further, an ex-post analysis of past scenario exercises 
provides an opportunity to analyse the motivations behind the scenario 
construction process itself. 
In this section we present the methods and results of an ex-post analysis of twelve 
scenario exercises of the whole UK energy system (1978 – 2002). This facilitates a 
better understanding of how scenarios are chosen and whether the key scenario 
elements held the role they were assumed to have in the scenario exercises. We 
look at the scenarios produced by different organisations and elicit crosscutting 
insights applicable to both scenarios developed mainly in a research context and 
those devoted to policy considerations. In the ex-post assessment, we capture, as 
much as possible, under what circumstances and why the different energy scenarios 
were developed, what motivated the selection of the scenario construction approach 
and the scenario choice, and how the insights from the scenario exercises were 
communicated. The insights that arise are then crystallised into key messages for 
the long-term energy scenario developers today. 
2.1 Method 
A systematic search of the UK energy scenario literature was conducted. The earliest 
energy scenarios were produced in 1978, just after the first oil crisis in 1973, when 
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energy-security concerns became key policy issues in the UK and worldwide. 
Although Littlechild et al. (1982) state that there were more than 40 models of the 
UK energy system and its sub-systems in 1980, many of these models and their 
results were produced by governmental organisations or the energy industry and 
were not published for wider audiences. All energy-related references, available at 
the British Library, between 1978 and 1985 were examined. This initial search 
identified several dozen references, from which a smaller number of ‘influential’ 
references were selected for further analysis. The references were considered 
influential if they had underpinned UK energy policy documents or if they were 
widely referenced and debated by other UK energy scenarios. For documents 
published after 1985, only key policy documents were selected for analysis as by 
this year there had been a proliferation of energy-related publications. The year 
2002 was chosen as the final year for analysis for two reasons: firstly, because the 
2003 UK Energy White paper changed the course of UK energy policy by 
emphasising climate change mitigation (Pearson and Watson, 2011); and secondly, 
because after this date, ex post assessment is limited.  
2.2 Overview of the past UK scenarios, 1978-2002 
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Table 1 provides a summary of the twelve UK energy scenario exercises 1978-2002 
that were assessed for this report. These scenarios were produced by various 
governmental, non-governmental and research organisations, and used different 
scenario construction approaches, such as extrapolation of historic trends, bottom-
up forecasting and cost-optimising energy system models. The scenarios analysed 
the energy system transition for 20 to 50 years ahead 
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Table 1. Summary of the analysed UK energy scenarios, 1978-2002 
Scenario 
exercise 
Year Type of 
organisation 
Scenario 
construction 
approach 
Scenario 
timeframe 
Number 
of 
scenarios 
UK Green Paper 1978 Government Extrapolation 1975-
2000 
1 
Low Energy 
Strategy 
1979 Research Bottom-up 
forecasting 
1976-
2025 
2 
Updated Green 
Paper 
1979 Government Extrapolation 1975-
2000 
2 
Scenarios of the 
Friends of the 
Earth  
1982 Non-
governmental 
organisation 
Not specified 1982-
2025 
2 
Birmingham 
Energy Model 
1982 Research Bottom-up, cost-
optimising energy 
systems model 
1977-
2026 
4 
MARKAL for the 
renewable 
energy 
programme 
1994 Government Bottom-up, cost-
optimising energy 
systems model 
1990-
2030 
18 
UK Energy 
Projections 
1995 Government Economic demand 
model, cost 
optimisation of 
electricity sector 
1995-
2020 
6 
MARKAL for the 
renewable 
energy 
programme 
1999 Government Bottom-up, cost-
optimising energy 
systems model 
1990-
2030 
10 
MARKAL for 
climate 
mitigation 
1999 Government Bottom-up, cost-
optimising energy 
systems model 
1990-
2030 
8 
Energy 
Projections 
2000 Government Economic demand 
model, cost 
optimisation of 
electricity sector 
2000-
2020 
6 
Energy–the 
changing 
climate 
2000 Independent 
experts 
Not specified 2000-
2050 
4 
Energy Review 2002 Government Not specified 2000-
2050 
5 
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UK Green Paper, 1978 
This paper was published during a time when there was growing interest in UK 
energy strategy, following from the 1973 oil crisis and the beginning of UK oil 
production in 1975. In 1973, the UK Department for Energy was established and in 
1978 released the UK Green Paper on Energy (UK Department of Energy, 1978). The 
aim of the Green Paper was to “set out the Government’s energy strategy proposal 
on which we invite to comment” (page iv, UK Department of Energy, 1978). A single 
scenario, called a “forecast,” was produced by extrapolating the trends in economic 
growth, energy prices, conservation and energy supply options. Although the Green 
Paper argued that it covered “a wide range of possible futures” (page 84, UK 
Department of Energy, 1978), only one scenario was included. The Green Paper 
sparked discussion about UK energy futures was followed by numerous alternative 
scenarios by other organisations, including many of those assessed in this report.  
Low Energy Strategy, 1979 
In 1979, in response to the single “forecast” scenario of the Green Paper that 
projected high energy demand growth, the International Institute of Environmental 
Development published their UK energy scenarios.  These scenarios aimed to 
“present a different view of the future… how the United Kingdom could have 50 
years of prosperous material growth and yet use less primary energy than it does 
today” (page 9, Leach et al., 1979). This analysis was based on a detailed, sectorial 
bottom-up simulation tool, which considered over 400 energy use categories. Two 
scenarios of low and high economic growth were constructed in order to 
demonstrate that high economic growth was possible with low energy demand, as a 
result of energy conservation measures and saturation effects.  In concluding the 
report, the authors argued that the energy futures presented in the IIED scenarios 
offered several benefits, including reduced energy dependence leading to a “low 
risk” future. 
Updated Green Paper, 1979 
In response to these debates, a year after the publication of the Green Paper on 
Energy, in 1979 the Department of Energy published an updated Green Paper (UK 
Department of Energy, 1979). Since the initial single scenario was the subject of 
criticism for its forecast-like nature and high demand growth assumption, the 
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updated scenarios were framed more cautiously; they were “not predictions of what 
will necessarily happen nor prescriptions of what would happen. The projections 
are, however, intended to provide a broad quantitative framework for the 
consideration of possible energy futures and policy choices” (page 1, UK 
Department of Energy, 1979). In the updated Green Paper, two cases of low and 
high economic growth were considered; high oil prices, conservation efforts and 
low deployment of renewables were also assumed. As a result, the updated Green 
Paper argued for an increasing role for energy conservation, nuclear and coal. 
Scenarios of Friends of the Earth, 1982  
Friends of the Earth, a non-governmental environmental organisation, also 
contributed to the debate on UK energy strategy with the publication of energy 
scenarios. Although we could not find the original source of these scenarios, we 
analyse them from the secondary source (ETSU, 1982). The Friends of the Earth 
scenarios aimed to demonstrate their vision of low energy demand in the UK 
through two scenarios: technical fix and conserver society.  
The Birmingham Energy Model, 1982  
The Birmingham Energy Model was the first and, at that time, the only, large-scale, 
computer-based, linear-programming model of the whole UK energy system 
(Littlechild et al., 1982). Its development started in 1974, just after the first oil 
crisis, and reflected the state-of-the-art research trend of linear-programming 
models such as MARKAL (Fishbone and Abilock, 1981) and MESSAGE (Agnew et al., 
1978). The aim of the model was “to calculate and compare optimal strategies for 
the UK energy sector…, to evaluate some current proposals for UK energy strategies 
in the light of the model’s results” (page 1, Littlechild et al., 1982). The Birmingham 
Energy Model embraced a number of existing assumptions for developing 
scenarios, including high demand growth scenarios from the 1978 Green Paper and 
low demand growth scenarios from the 1979 Low Energy Strategy. In addition to 
energy demand growth assumptions, scenarios with and without nuclear power 
were considered. This reflected growing concerns about nuclear energy after the 
Three Mile Island accident in 1979. The Birmingham Energy Model was used to 
evaluate contemporary UK energy proposals from a modelling perspective.  
MARKAL for the renewable energy programme, 1994 
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During the 1980s, UK energy policy was focused on electricity and gas sector 
privatisation and liberalisation. As a result, there is a gap in publications that used a 
scenario approach to assess the UK energy system until the 1990s. In 1991, the 
Department of Energy was abolished and energy issues fell under the remit of the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). Multiple developments in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s led to a renewed interest in energy scenarios: for example, in 
1988, the UK accepted the targets of the European Commission Large Combustion 
Plant Directive to reduce COx and SOx emissions; while, in 1992, the UK signed the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Rio de Janeiro; also, by 
1992 almost two thirds of deep coal mines were closed. The computer-based, cost-
optimising energy system modelling platform MARKAL was used by the Energy 
Technology Support Unit (ETSU) to develop a vision for UK energy (DTI, 1994; ETSU, 
1994a, b, 1995). In 1994, UK MARKAL was used to analyse the potential role of 
renewable energy strategies and research and development needs. A total of 18 
future scenarios were developed as composites of three levels of discount rates and 
six types of scenarios. These six types of scenarios combined different levels of oil 
and gas price, environmental efforts and nuclear deployment. Although the whole 
energy system was modelled in MARKAL, the scenario results were presented only 
on the uptake of individual renewable electricity generation technologies. 
UK Energy Projections, 1995 
The DTI energy projections (DTI, 1995) were developed to monitor the future 
development of UK energy markets. As concern about climate change increase 
increased, culminating in the adoption of the UNFCCC in May 1992, these energy 
projections also monitored whether the UK was on course to meet its emission 
mitigation commitments. The projections were based on an economic demand 
model, which reflected both historical trends and new policy developments; the 
electricity sector was based on a cost-optimisation model. Six scenarios of high, 
central and low economic growth were considered, as well as high and low fossil 
fuel prices. This was expected to “both encompass the likely range of possible 
outturns and, as importantly, indicate where the major uncertainties could arise” 
(page 14, DTI, 1995). The results were presented as quantitative scenarios of 
energy system and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.  
MARKAL for the renewable energy programme, 1999 
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In 1999, MARKAL was used to inform the update of the UK renewable energy 
development programme (ETSU, 1999). The modelled scenarios were used to 
capture the potential evolution of the market structure and how it would impact the 
deployment of renewables. Ten scenarios were analysed.  All of them assumed the 
central economic growth case, but were faceted to capture high and low fossil fuel 
prices, different GHG emission constraints, and minimum levels of renewable 
electricity. Results were also given for individual renewable energy technologies. It 
was argued that deployment of onshore wind, waste incineration, landfill gas, 
hydro, tidal stream and poultry litter were robust against the MARKAL scenarios. 
MARKAL for climate change mitigation, 1999 
With growing environmental awareness worldwide, MARKAL was also used to 
“examine the most cost-effective combinations of fuels and technologies” (page 1, 
DTI, 1999) for mitigating carbon dioxide, sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides and 
other emissions from the energy sector (DTI, 1999)). The scenarios referred to low, 
central and high demand growth, high and low fossil fuel prices and scenarios with 
and without nuclear. Under all of these scenarios, it was assumed that the emission 
mitigation goals were met and the implications of this were then analysed. The DTI 
concluded that the most cost-effective way to meet emission mitigation goals was 
“by reducing coal and oil use in favour of gas..., by increasing electricity generation 
from combined cycle gas turbines… and building up to 38GW of new nuclear plants” 
(page 8, DTI, 1999). 
UK Energy Projections, 2000 
The 2000 DTI energy projections (DTI, 2000) were an updated version of the 1995 
projections. The type of model used and the types of scenarios were essentially the 
same, although some parameter values were adjusted and new energy system 
trends were included. The results were presented as quantitative scenarios of the 
energy system and GHG emissions. 
“Energy–the changing climate” report, 2000 
In 2000, the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution published a report 
entitled “Energy-the changing climate” (2000).  The report concluded that UK 
carbon emissions should fall by 60% by 2050 in order to avoid the worst impacts of 
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climate change and had an enormous impact on UK energy policy. The report 
argued that “there is a moral imperative to act now” (page 50, Royal Comission on 
Environmental Pollution, 2000) and listed “actions that can and should be taken by 
the government and by other parties in the UK now” (p. 3). The report used four 
scenarios “to highlight the nature of the choices available for the UK” (p. 171). 
These scenarios combined constant, low and very low energy demand levels, high 
uptake of renewables, and cases with or without nuclear power and carbon capture 
and storage (CCS). These scenarios were not presented in a complete quantitative 
form, which would have included the evolution of primary demand, rather the 
report listed various individual requirements for energy demand reduction and for 
the deployment of low-carbon technologies. The report concluded “what these 
scenarios have in common is that they would all involve fundamental shifts over the 
next half century in the ways energy is obtained and used, and the associated 
infrastructures” (RCEP, 2000: p. 178). 
Energy Review, 2002 
The final report reviewed here is the Government’s 2002 Energy Review 
(Performance and Innovation Unit, 2002).  The aim of the review was to “initiate a 
national public debate about sustainable energy, including the roles of nuclear 
power and renewables” (page 6, Performance and Innovation Unit, 2002). The report 
listed lessons from five scenarios that included Business as Usual scenarios and 
four others, which were arranged around two axes: globalism versus regionalism, 
and commercialisation versus community. All of the scenarios met the 60% 
emission mitigation target by 2050. The report concluded that such mitigation was 
possible with sufficient energy efficiency measures, low carbon electricity and major 
progress with low carbon transport system. The report argued for strong policy 
attention to deliver these emission cuts. 
2.2.1 Scenario construction approaches 
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Table 1 shows the range of quantitative and semi-quantitative approaches that 
were used to develop these past UK energy scenarios. With only a few exceptions, 
the scenario developers did not justify in detail in the respective publications why 
they chose these types of approaches to generate scenarios and whether the 
scenario construction method affected the way in which the scenarios were 
interpreted. In comparison to the 1970s and 1980s, there is a much wider choice of 
energy systems modelling approaches today (e.g. (UCL Energy Insitute, 2013). 
Therefore, it is possible, indeed essential, to reflect upon which type of models fit 
the specific guiding questions at hand. Strachan (2011b) argues that as recently as 
2003 UK energy systems modelling capacity was at a nadir. Perhaps the dearth of 
available tools was a factor of the relatively weak explanation of the choice of tools.   
Most of these approaches, including the bottom-up forecasting tool of the Low 
Energy Strategy (Leach et al., 1979) and the cost-optimising Birmingham Energy 
Model (Littlechild et al., 1982), were developed with a particular publication in mind 
and reflected the state-of-the-art knowledge at that time. The whole system 
models, such as the Birmingham Energy Model or MARKAL, were both justified for 
their ability to cover the whole energy system and capture the supply-demand 
interactions, linkages between the different types of technologies or energy 
resources, and the role of costs. For example, ETSU (1999) explain the use of 
MARKAL in the renewable energy programme as follows:  
“the contribution that any technology may make in the future will be 
determined principally by the commercial availability of that technology, an 
exploitable resource, economic competitiveness of the technology compared 
to its competitors, and the overall demand for energy. The complex interplay 
between these factors makes it notoriously difficult to carry out credible 
technology assessments. In this exercise, as in the previous one in 1994, the 
problem has been addressed by applying a computer model in conjunction 
with a suite of future energy price and demand scenarios. The model used is 
MARKAL” (p. 249). 
In contrast to the other scenario exercises reviewed here, the pedigree of the 
MARKAL model is also emphasised; for example, “This model was developed by the 
IEA, who continue to refine it, and it has a substantial track record in technology 
assessment” (page 249, ETSU, 1999). 
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2.2.2 Scenario choices 
Table 2 shows the list of variables that were used to differentiate the UK energy 
scenarios in 1978-2002. The scenarios with different levels of economic growth 
and fossil fuel prices dominate among the different exercises. In some cases, like 
the Updated Green Paper 1979 and the Birmingham Energy Model 1982, fossil fuel 
prices were assumed to be high and no alternative price developments were 
considered at all. After the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents, the scenarios 
with and without nuclear power started to be differentiated. With the growing 
awareness about the environmental pollution and climate change, the scenario 
exercises from 1990s onwards started including cases of greenhouse gas emission 
mitigation or ambitious deployment of renewable energy. 
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Table 2. Variables used in constructing the UK energy scenarios 1978-2002 
Scenario 
Publication 
Year Economic 
growth 
Energy 
conservation 
effort 
Environmental 
concerns 
Fossil fuel 
price 
Renewable 
deployment 
Other 
technology 
deployment 
Green Paper 1978 High (Low) - - (Low) - 
Low Energy 
Strategy 
1979 
High; 
Low 
(High) - - (High) - 
Updated Green 
Paper 
1979 
High; 
Low 
(High) - (High) (Low) - 
Friends of the 
Earth  
1982 - (High) - - (High) - 
Birmingham Energy 
Model  
1082 - 
High 
Low 
- (High) - 
With nuclear; 
No nuclear 
MARKAL renewable 
energy programme 
1994 (High) - 
High concerns; 
Conventional 
concerns 
High; 
Conventional; 
Low; 
Shocks 
- 
With nuclear; 
No nuclear 
Energy Projections 1995 
High; 
Central; 
Low 
- 
- 
 
High; 
Low 
- - 
MARKAL for 
renewable energy 
programme 
1999 (Central) - 
-10%; 
-20% 
High; 
Low 
Unconstrained; 
High (>10%) 
- 
MARKAL for 
climate change 
1999 
High; 
Low 
- Targets met 
High; 
Low 
- 
With nuclear; 
No nuclear 
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mitigation 
Energy Projections 2000 
High; 
Central; 
Low 
- 
- 
 
High; 
Low 
- - 
Energy – the 
changing climate 
2000 - 
None; 
High; 
Very high 
-60% target met - High 
With nuclear or 
CCS1; 
Without nuclear 
or CCS1 
Energy Review 2002 - - -60% target met - - - 
1 CCS – carbon capture and storage 
NB. The values in brackets were assumed rather than considered as variables and thus these assumptions were obscured when 
scenarios are presented. 
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Figure 2 compares seven of the reviewed energy scenarios with the actual energy 
system transition.  It assesses these scenarios in terms of primary energy demand, 
which was chosen as a metric, because these values were reported in most of the 
analysed references (see Table 1).  If the scenarios are reviewed on the basis of how 
they managed to capture the dynamics and drivers of primary energy demand, 
Figure 1 shows that none of the scenarios managed to catch all of the key elements 
of the trend in primary energy demand. The economic growth assumptions of the 
two Green Papers (UK Department of Energy 1978, 1979) turned out in retrospect to 
be high, while the scenarios in the Energy Projections from the 1990s initially 
encapsulated the trend , they did not capture the later fall in energy demand, which 
in part was a response to the economic downturn of 2008. The Low Energy Strategy 
(Leach et al., 1979) managed to roughly capture the overall trend in primary energy 
demand evolution, because this was an influential study, it is possible that it 
influenced the evolution of the energy system  in the ‘desired’ direction depicted in 
the scenarios. However, Hammond (1998) and our own analysis demonstrate that 
while the Low Energy Strategy captured the overall trend in energy demand, it did 
not capture the determinants and structure. More ‘visionary’ scenarios, such as 
those of Friends of the Earth (1982), were ambitious when compared to other 
scenarios and the actual energy system development. However, if one wants to 
capture the whole “scenario trumpet” (Scholz and Tietje, 2002), the scenarios of 
Friends of the Earth add a valuable, albeit extreme perspective. Overall, the widest 
range of potential futures is covered by merging all types of scenarios from multiple 
organisations. 
 
Figure 2. Comparison of the actual primary demand evolution (black thick line) and 
the selected past UK energy scenarios in terms of primary energy demand, Mtoe  
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Figure 3 shows the structure of the primary energy demand by source for the 
scenario exercises carried out in the 1970s and 1980s. While some of the scenarios 
captured the general trend of the total primary energy demand evolution, most did 
not capture the underlying structure of the system evolution. In general, all the 
scenarios from the 1970s and 1980s expected a greater role for coal in the energy; 
the scenarios did not anticipate the environmental concerns that arose during the 
1990s. The role of gas was also underestimated; at that time, gas was not 
considered an option for electricity generation.  As Figure 3 demonstrates, the 
further into the future the scenarios reached, the more pronounced the deviations 
from the actual energy system evolution. One might suppose that the scenarios 
reflected the mainstream mind-set of the 1970s and 1980s (perhaps a result of the 
availability heuristic discussed in Section 2.2), which became an increasingly poor 
description of the system.  
 
Figure 3. The primary demand structure in 2000 and 2025 from the Green Paper 
1978, Low Energy Strategy 1979, Updated Green Paper 1979 and Birmingham 
Energy Model 1982  
2.2.3 Scenario interpretation 
In terms of the interpretation of scenarios, the assessed publications drew both 
numbers and insights (Huntington, 1982) from the scenarios. For example, the 
numbers extracted from the MARKAL scenarios for the renewable energy 
programme were as follows: “The cost-effective level of renewables generation in 
2010 lies in the range 16.0TWh to 41.2TWh, which represents between 4.2% and 
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11.0% of total electricity generation” (page 268, DTI, 1999). Examples of the 
insights from the Birmingham Energy Model included suggestions for fast 
extraction of domestic oil and shift to oil imports, gradual replacement of domestic 
gas with imports, switch from coal to nuclear and many others (Littlechild et al., 
1982). 
The more ‘visionary’ scenario exercises, such as the Low Energy Strategy (Leach et 
al., 1982), described their scenario results in terms of both numbers and insights, 
and also included normative statements. For example, the Low Energy Strategy 
depicted futures with a growing economy and a low energy demand, as well as self-
sufficiency via North Sea oil, 4.5-6 GW of nuclear and 120 tonnes of coal per year. 
The report also stated: 
“An energy future of this kind is a future of low risk. It offers material 
prosperity and the benefits of national self-confidence, yet without the 
nagging, conflict-prone pressures of resource constraints and the need for 
the public to accept large expansion of energy supplies. The emphasis on 
conservation would create a great diversity of jobs” (page 16, Leach et al., 
1979).  
Such a normative statement is unlikely to have been based solely on results from 
the bottom-up energy demand forecasting model used in the study. The Low 
Energy Strategy scenarios thus included statements that stretched further than the 
analytical scenario framework was able to provide. This is, however, a usual practice 
in interpreting normative, visionary scenarios (Trutnevyte, 2014; Trutnevyte et al., 
2011). 
2.3 Key lessons 
All of the analysed past UK energy scenarios (shown in   
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Table 1) were tightly linked to the key concerns and discussions at their time and 
thus prone to availability heuristic (see Section 2.2). The first oil crisis in 1973 and 
the subsequent start of the UK’s own oil exploitation in the North Sea in 1975, led 
to the first UK Green Paper on energy 1978. This paper sparked multiple other 
scenario exercises, which primarily critiqued the Green Paper, leading to the 
updating of this paper a year later. With concerns over unstable oil prices and 
societal vulnerability due to ever-growing energy demand, the scenario exercises in 
the 1970s and 1980s primarily varied the economic growth and fossil fuel price 
assumptions. In this way, these scenarios mirrored the biggest concerns at that 
time, but did not necessarily capture the key drivers and uncertainties of the actual 
energy system transition. In fact, since the late 1970s to the present day both the 
economic growth rate and the price of fossil fuels have risen and fallen (DECC, 
2009a), yet the actual energy system transition was not necessarily similar to the 
one envisioned in the scenarios. Perhaps more important than these two factors was 
the emergence of new concerns, including concerns about climate change and the 
recent  ‘dash for gas’ (Kern, 2012; Pearson and Watson, 2011). The structural 
uncertainty in the scenario approaches thus outperformed the parametric one on 
economic growth and fuel prices. However, these structural uncertainties are 
difficult to capture even when expert judgements are used. 
All of the later scenarios analysed here, those published between 1990 and 2002, 
incorporated an assumption of climate change mitigation; few considered scenarios 
of mitigation failure. As we have seen, the scenarios of the 1970s and 1980s 
assumed high economic growth, which did not turn out to be the case; it is possible 
that the current focus on climate change mitigation may prove to be similarly 
misguided. We thus recommend that mitigation failure scenarios are more widely 
included in the portfolio of scenarios considered in a given study.  
When concerns about nuclear safety arose in the late 1970s, multiple scenario 
exercises began to include scenarios without nuclear power. To some extent, this 
was caused by the availability heuristic, but it was also a result of broader societal 
learning processes about the potential impacts of nuclear power. In contrast to the 
multiplicity of scenarios without nuclear, in reality neither the complete phase-out 
of nuclear power nor a significant increase took place. More recently, the focus on 
climate mitigation and uncertainties around the deployment of carbon capture and 
storage (CCS) have led to the consideration of the scenarios with and without CCS. 
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Here, parallels with the scenarios of nuclear power from 1980s can be drawn, even 
if the two technology clusters have clear differences (e.g. nuclear was a commercial 
technology and its future role was uncertain mainly because of safety concerns; it 
remains uncertain whether CCS will reach commercial viability). 
Long-term energy system transition in the future is inevitably surrounded by 
multiple uncertainties. Table 1 shows that the past UK energy scenario exercises by 
different organisations covered different types of uncertainties and used different 
types of approaches. Even the extreme scenarios, such as those of Friends of the 
Earth (1982), are valuable if the analyst wishes wants to capture a broad range of 
possibilities. While there are inevitable trade-offs between descriptions of 
uncertainty and the strength of individual narratives (see also section 7.4.2 of this 
report), the richest and broadest picture of uncertainty and the potential transitions 
emerges when combining insights from multiple scenario studies. A cautionary 
remark must be added here: as discussed above, the Green Paper (UK Department 
of Energy, 1978) led to several publications which critiqued this scenario. When the 
Green Paper was updated in 1979, it sought to accommodate the range of 
perspectives suggested by other organisations, and eventually covered a much 
narrower range of potential futures (see Figure 1). Thus, while discussion and 
feedback may help to improve the quality of individual scenarios, it may also narrow 
down the range of futures considered. 
Between the late 1970s and the early 2000s, the UK energy system underwent a 
substantial change in its energy demand and supply characteristics, as well as in the 
related governance arrangements (Pearson and Watson, 2011). However, neither the 
approaches to model and scenario construction nor the choice of energy scenarios 
have reflected this change. This raises the question of whether the  UK scenario 
exercises analysed here turned a ‘blind eye’ to the broader institutional 
developments or whether the inclusion of these developments was considered to 
not affect either the scenario approach or the results. It is often argued that the 
influence of governance and the decision-making of key actors need to be reflected 
in analysing future energy system transitions (Foxon et al., 2010; Hughes et al., 
2013). Thus, further reflection on how the potential governance changes could be 
included in the construction of energy scenarios would be beneficial.  
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Finally, Figures 1 and 2 show that in the shorter term energy scenarios can 
encapsulate the actual energy system transition, but as we move further into the 
future, the uncertainties grow and the differences between the scenario results  and 
the actual trajectory deviate. Despite this, scenarios remain essential tools for 
strategic decision making, policy development and assessment; furthermore, only 
rarely are they meant to provide forecasts over long time periods. While there are 
no better tools for thinking about potential energy futures, energy scenarios will 
remain important. In order to improve the relevance of energy scenarios and to 
reduce the sensitivity of the scenario range to dominant contemporary 
assumptions, their iterative revision is essential; this will enable analysis to go 
beyond the assumptions that reflect the mind-set at that time and to include new 
developments. 
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3. The UKERC scenarios, 2009-2013 
Within the UKERC Phase 2 Energy Systems Theme (2009-2013), the scenario 
approach1 was widely used for addressing future uncertainties. However, it is not 
yet possible to assess these scenarios retrospectively. Thus, in this section we firstly 
compare the UKERC scenarios to the key messages that emerged from the ex-post 
analysis of the past UK energy scenarios, secondly look for insights by synthesising 
the different types of UKERC Systems Theme scenarios. As in the ex-post analysis, 
we aim to capture the circumstances and rationale for the development of different 
energy scenarios, the motivations for the scenario construction approach and 
scenario choice, and the ways in which the insights from the scenario exercises 
were communicated. 
3.1 Method 
This section of the report focused on the UKERC Phase 2 Energy Systems Theme 
work carried out between 2009 and 2013. We reviewed all of the UKERC Energy 
Systems Theme publications, including journal papers, reports and books, listed on 
the UKERC website (UKERC, 2014) . Only publications that specifically used energy 
scenarios or other types of scenarios were analysed in detail; conceptual or 
methodological publications, such as (Hughes et al., 2013), were not included. The 
following UKERC Phase 2 projects were included in this review: 
 Decarbonisation pathways in TIAM model; 
 Security of oil and gas supplies; 
 Energy system uncertainties; 
 Update of UK Energy 2050 Scenarios; 
 UKTM-UCL (no publications to date); 
 ETM-UCL (no publications to date); 
 Shale gas (no publications to date); 
 Indirect carbon costs of the UK energy system (no publications to date); 
 Industrial energy demand (no publications to date); 
                                                          
1
 i.e. the use of a (relatively small) number of different depictions of possible futures as a way of exploring and 
reflecting uncertainty.  
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 CCS: Realising the potential; 
 An options approach to UK energy futures; 
 Geopolitical economy of global gas security; and, 
 Whole system risk assessment of UK energy futures. 
3.2 Overview of the analysed UKERC scenarios, 2009-2013 
Table 3 provides a list of the UKERC Phase 2 Systems Theme publications that 
explicitly used scenarios to address future uncertainties in the energy system 
transition. Seventeen publications are included in this table and these publications 
cover about three quarters of all the UKERC Systems Theme publications.  The 
scenario approach has therefore been the key tool for analysing uncertainty within 
the UKERC Systems Theme.  
Table 3 lists the key guiding questions of these scenarios. Some of the scenarios 
exercises, such as (Kannan, 2011; Strachan, 2011a), have a more methodological 
focus, while others, such as (Ekins et al., 2011b; Markusson and Haszeldine, 2010), 
explicitly state policy recommendations. Since these scenario exercises took place 
after the UK had adopted an 80% climate mitigation target by 2050 (Climate Change 
Act, 2009), the vast majority of these scenarios focus on climate change mitigation. 
However, this climate change mitigation concern is just one part of the so-called 
‘energy policy trilemma’ which also covers affordability (Ekins et al., 2011b) and 
security of supply (Skea et al., 2011).  As with the ex-post analysis, these energy 
scenario exercises reflect the mind-set of their time. 
3.2.1 Scenario construction approach 
In comparison to past UK energy scenario exercises, which were assessed in Section 
3, UKERC Phase 2 had access to and developed a range of energy system models. 
Based on the specific guiding questions, different models were chosen and justified 
for scenario construction. The elastic demand variant of the MARKAL model was 
used most often for capturing the whole system dynamics and interactions and for 
evaluating climate change mitigation and other environmental policies (Anandarajah 
and Strachan, 2010; Ekins et al., 2013). While this model was consistently used for 
multiple analyses, it was also iteratively updated to include new policy and wider 
developments (Ekins et al., 2013). The MARKAL model was also extended 
methodologically to analyse questions other than those focused on the whole 
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system-related. Usher and Strachan (2012) used a stochastic version of the model 
to better capture the implications of uncertainties. Kannan (2011) added further 
temporal detail to MARKAL in order to gain better insights into the electricity 
dispatch, where high temporal resolution is key. The Cambridge multi-sectoral 
dynamic model (MDM-E3) was used to address the wider implications of 
environmental taxation on the economy. Chaudry et al. (2011) combined three 
models in order to analyse the interactions between climate change mitigation and 
energy system resilience. Finally, Watson et al. (2012) conceptually derived four 
scenarios of CCS deployment, which were based on the branching point framework. 
Overall, there is a wide availability of different types of models and approaches. The 
UKERC Systems Theme members seem to reflectively make their model choices and 
iteratively extend their models to adapt them to new emerging knowledge and to 
new questions.    
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Table 3. Summary of the analysed UKERC energy scenarios, 2009-2013; the publications are sorted according to the first author 
and the year of publication 
Authors  Year Approach/ 
model 
Focus or guiding 
question(s) 
Examples of explicit scenario interpretation statements * 
Anandarajah 
and Strachan 
 
 
2010 MARKAL 
elastic 
demand  
 
This study quantifies a 
range of policies, 
energy pathways, and 
sectoral trade-offs 
when combining mid- 
and long-term UK 
renewables and CO2 
reduction policies.” 
(p.6724) 
 
Insights, such as: 
 “Interactions between RO [Renewable Obligation], RTFO 
[Renewable Transport Fuel Obligations], and RHP [Renewable 
Heat Programme] policies drive trade-offs between low carbon 
electricity, bio-fuels, high efficiency natural gas, and demand 
reductions as well as resulting 2020 welfare costs” (p.6724) 
Numbers, such as: 
 “Under a cost optimal model pathway, existing UK policies and 
technology options in the Reference Scenario (RS) would 
reduce CO2 emissions in 2020 to about 500 MtCO2 and in 
2050 to 584 MtCO2.” (p.6727) 
Policy implications or decision support, such as: 
 none 
Methodological contributions, such as: 
 none 
Anandarajah 
et al.; 
Anandarajah 
et al.;  
Ekins et al. 
 
2009, 
2011, 
2011a 
MARKAL 
elastic 
demand 
Analyses “implications 
of long-term low-
carbon scenarios for 
the UK, and against 
these it assesses both 
the current status and 
the required scope of 
Insights, such as: 
 “In all cases, however, the costs of achieving the [carbon] 
reductions are relatively modest.” (p.865) 
 “When CO2 emissions are increasingly constrained… the model 
strongly decarbonises the electricity sector, and there is a 
huge change in the capacity mix in the power sector.” (p.871) 
Numbers, such as: 
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the UK energy policy” 
(p.865) 
 “If no new policies/measures are enacted, energy-related CO2 
emissions (in the Base reference scenario (B) in 2050 would be 
584 MtCO2, which is 6% higher than the 2000 emission level 
and only 1% lower than the 1990 emission level.” (p. 869) 
Policy implications or decision support, such as: 
 “These model runs reveal the single most important policy 
priority to be to incentivize the effective decarbonisation of the 
electricity system <…>. All the low-carbon model runs have 
substantial quantities of each of these technologies by 2050, 
indicating that their costs are broadly comparable and that 
each of them is required for a low-carbon energy future for 
the UK. The policy implications are clear: all these technologies 
should be developed.” (p.878) 
Methodological contributions, such as: 
 None 
Chaudry et 
al.;  
Skea et al. 
 
 
2011 MARKAL 
elastic 
demand 
 
WASP 
electricity 
generation 
planning 
model 
 
CGEN 
“This report explores 
ways of enhancing the 
“resilience” of the UK 
energy system to 
withstand external 
shocks and examines 
how such measures 
interact with those 
designed to reduce 
carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions” (Executive 
Insights, such as: 
 “Achieving the macro goals of reduced imports and greater 
supply diversity can be achieved through the vigorous pursuit 
of fairly conventional policy instruments. The key is a very 
strong emphasis on policies to improve energy efficiency in 
buildings and transport.… Keeping up the pace of investment 
in renewables and nuclear will also contribute.” (Executive 
summary, point 41) 
Numbers, such as: 
 “Applying these reliability standards adds to electricity system 
costs. The maximum annual increase across the scenarios is 
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combined 
electricity 
and gas 
networks 
model 
 
summary, point 2) £354m in 2020 (Low Carbon Resilient scenario), £575m in 
2035 (Low Carbon scenario) and £457m in 2050 (Resilient 
scenario).” (Executive abstract, point 24) 
Policy implications or decision support, such as: 
 “There are three possible models for stimulating such 
investment: Government provides the appropriate framework 
for the market to make the investment; the regulator permits 
the investment through price reviews, but the investment is 
provided by the regulated companies; Government carries out 
the investment itself.” (Executive summary, point 44) 
Methodological contributions, such as: 
 not specified 
Ekins et al. 
 
 
2011b Cambridge 
multisectoral 
dynamic 
model 
(MDM-E3) 
“Gain insights into the 
possible economic and 
environmental effects 
of a large-scale 
environmental tax 
reform (ETR) in the 
UK” (p.447) 
Insights, such as: 
 “These results suggest that substantial reductions in GHG 
emissions can be achieved with minimal impacts on output 
and an overall increase in employment” (p.447) 
Numbers, such as: 
 “Spending only 10% of the extra tax revenues on green 
investments results in a further reduction in CO2 emissions 
from the 1990 level of 3.5% from S1 [ETR scenario] to E1 [Eco-
innovation scenario].” (p.472) 
Policy implications or decision support, such as: 
 “In the absence of evidence to the contrary, they suggest that 
ETR is a very attractive policy indeed” (p.474) 
 “This leaves ETR as the preferred policy instrument to meet the 
UK’s GHG emission reduction targets. Other policy instruments 
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may be used to reinforce ETR, or increase the response to the 
shift in relative prices which it brings about.” (p.473) 
Methodological contributions, such as: 
 None 
Ekins et al. 
 
 
2013 MARKAL  
elastic 
demand 
“New UKERC scenarios 
incorporate the most 
recent policies and 
investigate the 
possible impacts 
of lower gas prices 
and measures 
to increase energy 
system resilience” (p. 
33) 
Insights, such as: 
 “A first obvious observation is that the resilience targets lead 
to significant emissions reductions, even if no additional 
policies beyond REF are introduced.” (Page 39) 
 “Nuclear appears to be the most economically attractive low-
carbon option.” (p.50) 
Numbers, such as: 
 “In REF [Reference case] and ADD [Additional policies scenario] 
under high gas prices, the carbon intensity of generation falls 
to 80-90 g/kWh by 2030 driven by the CPF [Carbon price 
floor] and fall further to about 30 g/KWh by 2050.” (p.41) 
Policy implications or decision support, such as: 
 “First, the electricity market reform (EMR) in the Energy Bill 
2012 must provide an economically viable transition for gas 
generators to move from base load to largely back-up 
generators by 2030.” (p.53) 
Methodological contributions, such as: 
 None 
Kannan 
 
 
2011 MARKAL 
with flexible 
time slicing 
“This paper reports on 
a methodology for 
temporal 
disaggregation in… 
Insights, such as: 
 “On the supply side, hydrogen-based electricity storage is 
greatly preferred but stored-hydrogen is used in the transport 
sector rather than for power system balancing mechanism” 
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MARKAL energy 
system model” 
(p.2261) 
(p.2261) 
Numbers, such as: 
 “On average, the system chooses about 7–10% of electricity 
demand as storage.” (p.2261) 
Policy implications or decision support, such as: 
 none 
Methodological contributions, such as: 
 “Nonetheless, the model results do revel that the temporal 
MARKAL sheds powerful insights on the role of demand and 
supply-side energy storage.” (Page 2270) 
Markusson 
and 
Haszeldine 
 
 
2010 Technology-
choice 
informed 
qualitative 
judgement 
“Climate change 
legislation requires 
emissions reductions, 
but the market shows 
interest in investing in 
new fossil fuelled 
power plants. The 
question is whether 
capture ready policy 
can reconcile these 
interests.” (p. 6695) 
Insights, such as: 
 “Capture readiness comes with serious uncertainties and is no 
guarantee that new-built fossil plants will be abatable or 
abated in the future.” (p.6695) 
Numbers, such as: 
 none 
Policy implications or decision support, such as: 
 “We have… shown that the only safe way to avoid further 
carbon lock-in, until CCS has been developed, is to not build 
new fossil plants.” (p.6702) 
Methodological contributions, such as: 
 None 
McGlade and 
Ekins 
 
 
2014 Global 
energy 
system 
model TIAM  
“This paper examines 
the volumes of oil that 
can and cannot be 
used up to 2035 
Insights, such as: 
 “The above results demonstrate that large volumes of oil 
currently considered to be reserves cannot be produced before 
2035 if there is to be an evens chance of limiting the global 
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 Bottom-up 
economic 
and 
geological 
oil field 
production 
model 
BUEGO 
 
during the transition 
to a low-carbon global 
energy system.” (Page 
102) 
average temperature rise to 2oC” (p.111) 
Numbers, such as: 
 “On a global scale nearly 600 Gb of oil reserves must remain 
unused by 2035 in a scenario where CCS is unavailable, 
around 45% of available reserves” (p.111) 
Policy implications or decision support, such as: 
 “The work thus demonstrates the extent to which current 
energy policies encouraging the unabated exploration for, and 
exploitation of, all oil resources are incommensurate with the 
achievement of a low-carbon energy system” (p.102) 
 “To conclude, a large disconnect appears to exist between 
policies permitting exploration in new areas, particularly in 
Arctic and deepwater areas, and pledges to restrict 
temperature rises to 2oC. The continued licensing of new areas 
for oil exploration is only consistent with declared intentions 
to limit CO2 emissions and climate change if the majority of 
fields that are discovered remain undeveloped, which fatally 
undermines the economic rationale for their discovery in the 
first place.” (p.111) 
Methodological contributions, such as: 
 None 
Strachan 
 
 
2011a MARKAL 
elastic 
demand 
“This paper argues 
that the range of 
existing energy and 
emissions policies are 
an integral part of any 
Insights, such as: 
 “Interestingly, in comparing the change from BAuU vs. REF 
[Reference] cases to the standard vs. high fossil price cases, 
the two effects give approximately the same order of impact of 
costs. Thus the inclusion of existing polices in modelling long-
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long-term baseline, 
and hence already 
represent a “with-
policy” baseline, 
termed here a 
Business-as-Unusual 
(BAuU)” (p.153) 
term decarbonisation pathways appears to be comparable to a 
major exogenous modelling assumption — that of global fossil 
fuel prices.” (p.160) 
Numbers, such as: 
 “By 2050, removing existing policies gives an increase in CO2 
marginal costs from £182/tCO2 to £205/tCO2 and in annual 
welfare loss from £20.6 billion to £25.2 billion.” (p.160) 
Policy implications or decision support, such as: 
 none 
Methodological contributions, such as: 
 “Best practice in energy modelling would be to have both a no-
policy reference baseline, and a current policy reference 
baseline (BAuU). At a minimum, energy modelling studies 
should have a transparent assessment of the current policy 
contained within the baseline.” (p.153) 
 “If it is not done, energy models will likely underestimate the 
true cost of long- term emissions reductions.” (p.160) 
Strachan and 
Usher 
 
 
 
2012 MARKAL  
elastic 
demand 
 
“This paper makes a 
significant 
contribution to current 
analytical efforts to 
account for realistic 
second-best climate 
mitigation policy 
implementation.” 
(p.121)  
Insights, such as: 
 “Under a combinatory second-best scenario, meeting targets 
greater than a 70% reduction in CO2 by 2050 entail costs 
above a subjective barrier of 1% of GDP, while extreme 
mitigation scenarios (>90% CO2 reduction) are infeasible.” 
(p.121) 
Numbers, such as: 
 “Under a second-best scenario, a 90% CO2 reduction by 2050 
requires an economy wide carbon price of £538/tCO2 and 
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incurs an annual welfare cost of £33.7 billion.” (p.136) 
Policy implications or decision support, such as: 
 “For a developed country such as the UK which has positioned 
itself in the vanguard of global climate mitigation efforts this 
finding supports the current legislative efforts to plan a long-
term decarbonisation pathway” (p, 136) 
Methodological contributions, such as: 
 “By demonstrating the fragilities of a low carbon energy 
system pathway, policy makers can explore protective and 
proactive strategies to ensure targets can actually be met.” 
(p.121) 
Usher and 
Strachan 
 
 
2012 Two stage 
stochastic 
MARKAL 
“We investigate the 
effect of two critical 
mid-term 
uncertainties on 
optimal near-term 
investment decisions 
using a two-stage 
stochastic energy 
system model.” 
(p.435) 
Insights, such as: 
 “This paper shows that for those uncertain variables that result 
in divergent near-term actions under perfect information, it is 
important to make decisions in a manner that take account of 
the uncertainties, for these uncertainties can be extremely 
expensive.” (p.443) 
Numbers, such as: 
 “Evaluating the uncertainty under a decarbonisation agenda 
shows that fossil fuel price uncertainty is very expensive at 
around £20 billion. The addition of novel mitigation options 
reduces the value of fossil fuel price uncertainty to £11 
billion.” (p,435) 
Policy implications or decision support, such as: 
 None 
Methodological contributions, such as: 
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 “Stochastic MARKAL is a powerful tool for investigating the 
complex systemic dynamics of energy focused decision-
making under uncertainty” (p.444) 
Watson 2012  “One of the goals of 
our project has been 
to contribute to the 
analysis of the 
conditions for both 
‘successful’ and 
‘unsuccessful’ CCS 
deployment, and what 
actions by policy 
makers and other 
decision makers might 
influence the 
outcome. To that end, 
a set of pathways were 
developed for CCS 
from now to 2030” 
(p.33) 
Insights, such as: 
 “A supportive political, policy and financial environment allows 
CCS projects to be competitive and financed through a 
combination of debt and equity” (p. 38) 
Numbers, such as: 
 None 
Policy implications or decision support, such as: 
 “To achieve this aim requires comprehensive policy support 
now. Whilst the CCS roadmap promises such comprehensive 
support, the commercialisation programme needs to yield firm 
commitments to build several full scale CCS projects as soon 
as possible.” (p.43) 
Methodological contributions, such as: 
 None 
Winskel et al. 
 
 
2009 MARKAL  
elastic 
demand 
 
“This chapter 
considers the wider 
‘system-level’ 
implications of supply 
side accelerated 
technology 
Insights, such as: 
 “The most attractive low carbon supply technologies – and the 
research priorities associated with their commercialisation – 
are sensitive to overall level of decarbonisation ambition. 
Raising the decarbonisation ambition from 60% to 80% does 
not simply mean doing ‘more of the same’ – it introduces new 
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development, and also 
the interactions 
(competitive and 
synergistic) between 
different technologies 
when accelerated 
development 
assumptions are 
aggregated together.” 
(p.110) 
technology preferences and research priorities.” (p.111) 
Numbers, such as: 
 “Renewable electricity provides a much greater proportion of 
primary energy demand by 2050 in accelerated scenarios: 
almost 20% in LC Acctech [Low Carbon Accelerated technology 
scenario] 80, compared to under 5% in LC Core 80 [Low 
Carbon Core scenario].” (p.112) 
Policy implications or decision support, such as: 
 “Accelerating the development of emerging low carbon energy 
supply technologies offers significant long term benefit, in 
enabling alternative and potentially more affordable 
decarbonisation of the UK energy system” (p.136) 
Methodological contributions, such as: 
 None 
Winskel 
 
2011 MARKAL  
elastic 
demand 
 
“This chapter 
considers the potential 
for accelerating the 
development of a 
number of emerging 
low carbon energy 
supply technologies, 
and the possible 
impact of accelerated 
development on UK 
energy system 
decarbonisation 
Insights, such as: 
 “The analysis suggests that accelerated development could 
open up more affordable and more diverse decarbonisation 
pathways over the longer term.” (p.187) 
Numbers, such as: 
 “Between 2010 and 2050, accelerated technology 
development provides a total savings in the welfare costs 
of achieving 80 per cent decarbonisation of £36bn.” 
(p.207) 
3.2.2 Policy implications or decision support, such as: 
 “Within these broader international efforts, UK public and 
private RD&D can make important contributions, and under a 
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pathways” (p.187) long-term view of investment, the analysis indicates there is 
an economic case for a step change increase in UK annual 
public spending on energy RD&D.” (p.188) 
Methodological contributions, such as: 
 None 
* This list is not exhaustive as every study reviewed here included multiple insights and conclusions 
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3.2.3 Scenario choices 
The table in Appendix 3 summarises the scenarios used in the UKERC Phase 2 
System Theme and elicits the key variables that were used for scenario 
construction. As with the analysis of energy scenarios, the UKERC scenarios 
represent the mind-set of their time, which maps on to the availability 
heuristic. Given the UK’s commitment to cut GHGs emissions by 80% by 2050 
(Climate Change Act, 2009), all of the UKERC scenarios take climate change 
mitigation considerations into account; such a practice can be prone to 
overconfidence bias. With the exception of Strachan and Usher (2012), all the 
UKERC scenarios analyse, and often concentrate on, cases with ambitious 
climate mitigation efforts. As before, UKERC may benefit from an exploration 
of assumptions other than that of this single dominant driver. There have 
also been a number of scenarios that explore energy futures, with and 
without CCS, which again reflects the present focus on climate change 
mitigation, and uncertainties about the availability and impact of novel 
technologies.  
A key difference between past UK scenarios and the UKERC scenarios is 
UKERC’s focus on constructing scenarios under varying policy contexts. For 
example, many UKERC scenarios take different types of policies into account 
in order to assess their implications. It is possible that by a focus on policy 
(possibly a result of the confirmation and overconfidence biases, see Section 
2.2) may distract attention from other, non-policy drivers of the energy 
system transition; the insights provided by these other drivers may be as 
interesting to explore within scenario narratives. For example, this analysis 
has shown past UK scenarios narrowly focused on economic growth and fossil 
fuel prices, but did not anticipate growing concern about climate change and 
the more recent “dash for gas.” The focus on a limited number of variables 
has arguably limited the exploration of possible futures to only those factors 
considered important at the time of scenario construction. As a result, the 
range of future scenarios for energy system transitions is arguably narrower 
than it might otherwise be.  
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3.2.4 Interpretation of scenarios 
The assessment revealed that the UKERC scenarios are used to generate both 
insights and numbers (Huntington et al., 1982). Both insights and numbers 
are important since the generation of insights alone is unlikely to be 
sufficient to inform UK energy policy and decision-making. For some of the 
UKERC scenarios exercises influencing policy is also an important outcome; 
for example (Ekins et al., 2011b; McGlade and Ekins, 2014), interpret their 
scenarios from a policy perspective and explicitly state the policy implications 
of their work. In addition to insights, numbers and policy implications, some 
of the UKERC publications have also undertaken methodological 
interpretation of their scenarios. For example, Strachan (2011a) and Strachan 
and Usher (2012) explicitly aspired  to make methodological contributions 
and used scenarios to illustrate the added-value of the newly developed 
approaches.  
3.3 Key lessons 
For UKERC, scenarios are key tools for addressing uncertainties and for 
thinking about future energy system transitions. The Centre uses diverse 
approaches, including state-of-the-art energy system models, selected to fit 
the question at hand, to understand and analyse a comparatively broad range 
of uncertainties and potential future developments. The longitudinal UKERC 
funding also allows for iterative revision of the models and scenarios in light 
of new developments and knowledge. As we have seen from the analysis of 
past UK energy scenarios, even when different research projects generate and 
use different scenarios, this use of multiple models, perspectives and their 
continuing development is a key strength of the approach adopted by UKERC. 
However, as we have seen it is also important to avoid placing too much 
emphasis on issues of contemporary concern; for the past scenarios this was 
economic growth and fossil fuel prices, while for the present UKERC work the 
assumption that we will meet our climate change mitigation targets arguably 
limits our assessment of energy futures. 
UKERC has undertaken a variety of approaches to the construction of 
scenarios to provide a wide range of outcomes, including insights, numbers, 
methodological contributions and policy implications. Which outcome is 
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emphasised depends on the aim and objective of each project and report, 
while some of the scenario exercises place an emphasis on the policy 
implications, many others do not. In some scenario exercises, there may be 
opportunities to further draw out policy implications, and focus insights and 
interpretation more directly to policy issues. The next section addresses this 
issue in more depth, by focusing on the communication and use of insights 
from a key UKERC scenario-generating tool, the UK MARKAL model. 
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4. Reflections on the communication and use of 
scenarios developed with UK MARKAL 
Having reviewed past UK energy scenarios (1978-2002) and the UKERC 
scenario work, the following section focuses on the communication and use 
of scenarios derived from energy system models, particularly MARKAL, that 
were used during UKERC Phases 1 and 2.  In particular, this research 
examines how energy scenarios derived from system models have been 
represented in (policy) documents, in order to explore whether the models 
are used in the way that their producers intended them to be used.  Rather 
than focusing on improving the energy scenarios that are derived from 
energy system models, we focused on how the ‘producers’ of energy system 
models, like MARKAL, can improve their communication and use. 
4.1 Best practice in use and communication of model-based scenario 
results 
Hodges and Dewar (1992) articulated a well-known set of conditions that are 
required for a model to be considered ‘validatable’. The system being 
modelled: 
1. Must be observable; 
2. Must exhibit constancy of structure through time; 
3. Must exhibit constancy across variations in conditions not specified in 
the model; and, 
4. Must permit collection of ample and accurate data.  
Several authors have noted that in the case of energy models conditions 2 
and 3 do not hold (Craig et al., 2002; DeCarolis et al., 2012), which has 
important implications for the way in which such models should be used in 
practice. Scholars have attempted to articulate sets of guidelines or rules for 
best practice use of models under these circumstances ((Craig et al., 2002; 
DeCarolis et al., 2012; Funtowicz and Saltelli, 2014; Robinson, 1992; 
Schneider, 1997). These provide some insight into key issues for the use and 
communication of such tools. Key issues common to these papers include:  
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 Appropriate matching of the tool to the question, which typically 
requires focusing on ‘insights, not numbers’ (Huntington et al., 1982; 
Schwarz and Hoag, 1982), and clarity about the lack of predictive 
power.  
 Clarity about uncertainty and sensitivity, including appropriate 
discussion of model uncertainty as well as parameter uncertainty, and 
clarity about the parameters to which key model outputs are most 
sensitive.  
 Discussions of transparency recognise that this includes transparently 
published data and assumptions, but also other dimensions. In 
particular, the literature notes the value of an extended peer 
community able to fully understand and critique the model and its 
results, and the basic trade-off between model detail and complexity 
on the one hand, and ease of comprehension and interpretability on 
the other.  
 Appropriate communication. For example, the literature highlights the 
importance of ensuring that information is structured such that those 
reading only summaries and conclusion sections receive information 
that enables them to evaluate conclusions in light of top-level 
uncertainties and limitations. Similarly, it is often suggested that 
numerical information should be reported at appropriate levels of 
precision given the uncertainties (i.e. with relatively few significant 
figures for highly uncertain information).  
The UK government has also highlighted the importance of good practice in 
the use of “business critical models” in government, through the MacPherson 
Review (Macpherson, 2013). This review was initiated in response to the 
widely reported analytic failure associated with the renewal of the West Coast 
Mainline rail franchise, in which the decision not to award the franchise to 
Virgin Trains was shown to be at least partly a result of improper use of 
modelling results. This experience has led to a government-wide process to 
improve the use of analytic tools. The resulting MacPherson Review provided 
a list of key issues that must be considered in conducting and communicating 
analysis to government audiences. It also provides important context for the 
way in which UKERC tools will be assessed and appraised by civil service 
analysts.  
59 
 
59 
 
4.2 Methods  
In order to address these research aims, two key methods were used: 
document analysis and semi-structured interviews.   
4.2.1 Document analysis 
The first component of the research involved analysis of key documents that 
have used energy scenarios generated by energy system models in order to 
ascertain how they have been represented to date. A total of 27 documents 
were analysed, which included policy documents (11), academic publications 
(5), consultation submissions (2), reports to government (4), UKERC reports 
(2) and model documentation (3).  These were chosen in order to provide a 
balance of documents that reflected the development and use of scenarios 
derived from the energy system models.   The documents were read and, 
following discussion, a coding frame was developed.  As new codes emerged, 
the documents were reread and coded according to the new structure.  This 
process was used to develop broad themes, around which to structure the 
interviews and subsequent analysis.  Codes included: 
 Aims and purpose;  
 Caveats and uncertainties; 
 Language; and, 
 Insights and conclusions. 
4.2.2 Interviews 
The second component of the review consisted of semi-structured interviews 
with modellers and consumers of energy scenarios, with a focus on those 
scenarios produced through UKERC Phase 2.  The interviews were used to 
investigate perceptions of the insights generated by such scenarios, and 
experiences of communicating and using the outputs of scenario modelling 
processes.  Semi-structured interviews were used to enable the discussion to 
stay focused whilst allowing new lines of enquiry to be followed up.   
Drawing on the document analysis, an initial list of questions was 
generated.  This was then trialled with a member of the UCL modelling team 
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and subsequently refined.  Two interview protocols were developed – one for 
model ‘producers’ and one for model ‘consumers’ – although there was some 
overlap between these; Appendices 1 and 2 contain the final interview 
protocols.  The protocols were structured around several themes to provide a 
framework for discussion, these included:   
 Key policy questions that could be informed by a scenario-
modelling process; 
 How scenarios and other outputs are used in practice; 
 Uncertainty; and, 
 Communication. 
A total of 17 face-to-face and telephone interviews were held over a six week 
period from January to March 2014.  There were eleven interviews with model 
‘producers’ i.e. members of UCL’s modelling team and others within the 
wider UKERC research community, and six with model ‘consumers’ i.e. those 
working in policy; however, as will be discussed in Section 4.3.2, the 
distinction between the producers and consumers of scenarios is, in reality, 
somewhat blurred.  All interviews were digitally recorded, and the detailed 
notes taken in interviews were supplemented where necessary with the 
recordings.  All comments by interviewees have been anonymised.   
4.3 Results 
Use of MARKAL to inform policy: Insights, numbers and answers 
Interviewees identified a diversity of uses to which MARKAL-type models can 
be put, which may be summarised as providing a framework for thinking and 
learning about the energy system, particularly over the longer term.  Several 
interviewees working for government spoke of the importance of scenario 
modelling processes in demonstrating that the ‘aspirational’ carbon reduction 
targets set by government were achievable and affordable.  However, there 
was some disagreement on whether estimating the costs of achieving policy 
targets was a good use of the model, in line with the common statement that 
models shall be used for “insight, not numbers” (Huntington et al., 1982).  
Analysis of the documents and interviews identified a number of more 
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specific, but interrelated, uses to which energy system models, including 
MARKAL, can be put, as the following section discusses. 
Firstly, as a systems model, MARKAL may be used to provide insights into 
interactions across the energy system.  As a result, a common use of MARKAL 
has been to examine the long-term, cross-sectoral trade-offs and to provide 
insights into optimal pathways.  One academic interviewee provided some 
examples of the types of interactions that may be explored using a MARKAL 
model: 
“Obvious examples [of interactions across the system] would be what 
do you do with our limited biomass?  Or you can think about what you 
do with electricity? Or what’s the trade-off between demand reduction 
versus supply decarbonisation?” 
One civil servant also drew attention to the use of such models in drawing 
together different silos within the department, providing a framework for 
considering interactions across the different teams within the department.  
A second use concerned the long-term evolution of the energy system.  This 
had a number of facets, for instance providing insights into pathways to 
decarbonisation and the way in which different carbon reduction targets 
could be met.  Another use of MARKAL was to provide insights into how 
decisions made today determine the way in which the system could develop.  
Drawing attention to these decision points, scenario modelling processes 
aided policymakers in their understanding of when ‘least regret decisions 
diverged from the optimal pathway’.  Although some interviewees cautioned 
that such processes should not be used for decision making, one interviewee 
argued that tools such as MARKAL had been used to ‘support decisions that 
were made for other reasons’.  This highlights the more instrumental uses to 
which analysis may be put (see Section 1.1).  In terms of technologies, and in 
contrast to earlier uses of MARKAL, one interviewee spoke of the role of 
scenario modelling processes in highlighting ‘useful’ technologies, rather 
than in ‘picking winners’.  Also regarding the long-term system evolution, 
interviewees spoke of the importance of scenario modelling processes in 
asking ‘what-if’ questions; for example, one interviewee described using 
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energy system models to provide insights into the way in which different 
policy and governance structures affect the evolution of the energy system. 
A final area of questions that could be informed by scenario modelling 
process related to understanding how sometimes competing, policy goals and 
objectives influence differences in technology and energy pathways, typically 
with reference to a Business As Usual scenario.  In this way, MARKAL had 
been used to: identify areas for future policy; inform policy positions and 
arguments; and, understand the impacts of certain policies, including the 
knock-on effects and impacts across the wider energy system.   
In addition to these broad areas of questions there were some specific uses 
of MARKAL to inform policy.  For example, one civil servant emphasised the 
value of the model in identifying technology pathways that government 
should consider supporting; in other words as a way of identifying specific 
technologies that government should promote in order to meet targets.  
Document analysis also reveals that the use of MARKAL within the Technology 
Innovation Needs Assessments (TINAs) has been highly focused on numbers 
and technology-specific scenarios. Examination of the documents revealed 
that scenario-modelling processes using MARKAL-type models have been 
used to: 
- Demonstrate the feasibility of the overall strategic ambition; 
- Indicate the overall costs of carbon abatement and targets (Energy 
White Paper, 2007; Climate Change Act Impact Assessment, 2008) 
- Justify support for particular technologies (Nuclear White Paper, 2008; 
National Policy Statement on Nuclear Power Generation, 2009) 
- Prioritise R&D (TINAs) 
- Identify strategic and/ or pathway issues, including the timing of the 
transition, the role of different sectors and the relative importance of 
national vs. international action. 
Given these varying uses, interviews revealed that MARKAL has also been 
used at different stages in the policy cycle – for identifying different 
(technology) options, for setting positions and for setting the strategic 
direction. 
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Although the analysis of the UKERC publications in Section 4 showed that 
many publications emphasised the methodological novelty of constructing 
scenarios, such uses of MARKAL-type models were not mentioned in the 
interview. 
What have we learnt? 
Document analysis and interviews revealed a range of consistent insights that 
have emerged from scenario-modelling processes using MARKAL-type 
models.  These included the feasibility of the transition, the role of power 
sector decarbonisation and the requirement for a mixed portfolio of 
technologies.  These are discussed briefly below. 
The feasibility of the transition to a low carbon energy system, including 
insights into possible pathways for reaching those energy futures.  Several 
respondents highlighted the contribution made by MARKAL to the 
establishment of the 2008 Climate Change Act, particularly in demonstrating 
the feasibility of an 80% emissions reduction target by 2050.  However, a 
consequence of this key role was that while the model could ‘still do other 
things, one of its key jobs was potentially done’. 
The importance of power sector decarbonisation in meeting long-term 
carbon mitigation goals.  Scenario modelling processes using MARKAL have 
drawn attention to the interactions of a decarbonised electricity sector with 
other sectors, the scale of transformation required, and the timing of 
decarbonisation; for instance, a finding that emerges across scenarios is that 
the electricity sector decarbonises early, while the transport sector 
decarbonises later.  As one interviewee explained:  
“If you decarbonise your power system early and significantly, it makes 
everything else much easier.  That's a pretty robust insight across a 
whole bunch of measures and if you don't decarbonise your power 
system then you're in a very low demand world or you're importing a 
lot of biofuels - these are viable strategies, but the model often comes 
up with these other strategies as a support to electricity 
decarbonisation as opposed to a replacement”. 
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The analysis also revealed that meeting long-term carbon mitigation targets 
required a mixed portfolio of technologies, which includes renewables, 
nuclear and CCS in the power sector.  Other insights included:  
 The affordability of the energy transition.  Scenarios reveal that the 
transition will cost between 0.5 and 3% of GDP in 2050; interviewees 
recognised that while this was not a small number, it was a 
manageable one.  
 The timing of the transition.  For example, highlighting when 
investments need to be made to avoid stranded assets. 
 The international context.  This includes the uptake and affordability of 
international carbon credit, emissions trading and the availability of 
different energy resources (e.g. biomass) and the impacts on the 
evolution of the UK energy system. 
 The role of demand reduction, energy efficiency and conservation in 
meeting carbon emission reduction targets.  
“Insights not numbers” 
Modellers often refer to ‘insights not numbers’ (e.g. (Huntington et al., 1982; 
Strachan et al., 2009)), a phrase which found salience with many participants.  
That the model did not provide forecasts or predictions about the future was 
emphasised by interviewees, as well as in many of the reviewed documents.  
Rather, scenario-modelling processes using MARKAL-type tools provide a 
framework for exploring possible futures under a given set of assumptions.  
For example, one academic modeller commented: 
“All the model is doing is [providing] a foundation for helping you to 
think through certain processes in a logical way”. 
For some respondents, the ‘real’ value of MARKAL was to understand the 
differences between scenarios and what drove these differences.  For one civil 
servant, although the model only told the user about the modelled world, its 
use was in being able to retain more information.  He explained: 
“For me personally, the model is just telling you about the model.  
What’s useful is that it plays back things that you can’t hold in your 
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brain.  You’d have liked to be able to do it all in your head, but you 
can’t so you have a model that tells you something interesting about 
the model and then you do a translation between the model and the 
real world”. 
This sentiment was echoed by others who argued that the model enabled a 
more concrete explanation of future energy scenarios, one that demonstrated 
what the consequences might be of a specific scenario across different 
aspects of the modelled energy system.  However, a corollary of this was that 
the ability to glean insights came from familiarity with the model.  One 
interviewee likened the expert use of MARKAL to being a craft, he explained:   
“I think about these things as being a tool – if you have someone 
skilled in MARKAL they will be able to use it do pieces of analysis that 
if you just read the manufacturer’s instructions it wouldn’t help you to 
do very much at all.  So it’s [about being] a technical artist... an artist 
as in craft”. 
Similar statements were made by other modellers who explained that the 
ability to draw insights from the scenarios was developed through a long 
process of seeing different results and scenarios.  However, interviewees also 
expressed concern that placing too much emphasis on ‘insights, not 
numbers’ ran the risk of rendering meaningless both the model and any 
outputs generated by the model.  This argument had two facets.  Firstly, as 
quantitative models, the numbers generated by MARKAL and other energy 
system models were important; numbers were one output generated by these 
models that it was not possible to derive from other scenario approaches.  
Secondly, numbers not insights were argued to frame policy debates.  
Modellers stressed that they always took care to present a range, but that it 
was ‘inevitable’ that some numbers ‘got stuck’ in the debate.   
Generally, it was felt that both insights and numbers were important.  While 
the insights were ‘intuitive’ for experts and more suitable for an experienced 
audience, numbers were often more important for policy assessments.  As 
one modeller explained: 
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“People who really get to understand the models, and who really think 
about the uncertainties within the model, tend to lose interest in the 
numbers and become more interested in the insights”. 
This quote again highlights the importance of experience when thinking 
through and interpreting the outputs of MARKAL-type models.  However, 
others cautioned that providing numbers implied too much certainty, 
particularly when given to several decimal places.  It was felt that ‘spurious 
accuracy’ in the numbers brought in false confidence and potentially led to 
uninformed or misinformed decisions.  As one wider UKERC academic 
observed: 
“If we provide a number, that number implies some certainty, [it] gives 
policymakers something to hang their hats on – its another thing they 
don’t have to worry about, because they feel that problem has been 
sown up”.  
This was echoed by a civil servant who argued that others became fixated on 
the numbers, and that a key challenge was to provide policy makers that it 
was possible to have an insight without the numbers.  Several from the 
modelling team spoke of their experiences of interacting with policy makers 
and other consumers, where despite detailed modelling work to draw out the 
insights, ‘really what they wanted was a number’  This highlights the tension 
between the uses to which these models can and have been put, and the 
kinds of insights that can be provided.   For example, several interviewees 
referred to the outputs derived from MARKAL-type models being used to 
provide political cover.  One civil servant, for instance, argued that numbers 
from modelling exercises were often cited in support of particular positions, 
or to justify particular projects or policies.  That scenarios were also used to 
confirm internal biases or, conversely, were ignored or critiqued when they 
failed to match existing beliefs about the future energy system was also 
mentioned by several respondents.    
‘Telling the right story’  
An important message to emerge from the interviews, particularly those with 
working within government, was the importance of ‘telling a story’ rather 
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than simply producing and describing detailed outputs.  The importance of 
using MARKAL-type models to construct stories about, for example, what the 
possible impacts of a policy might be was recognised by many participants.  
The ability of the model to quantify and disaggregate the story in a way that 
was internally consistent enabled the modeller to create and tell a 
complicated story.  However, despite this, one civil servant expressed his 
frustration that these stories remained hidden and untold.  He explained: 
“What annoys me most about MARKAL as someone who hasn't been fully 
trained up in it, but I have prodded it a bit and have looked over the 
shoulders of those who are trying to use it, is that it makes that process 
very hard to do.  Because it is very hard for it to spit out the story as to 
why you get the end result that you're seeing... What I'd love to have is the 
story that says, if this happens, then that will happen and that will 
happen, and the final outcome will be this.  But very rarely do you see it 
written in that way.  What's different about the 2050 calculator from 
MARKAL - obviously there's an order of magnitude of simplicity - but 
you're the optimiser, so effectively you have to go through the story and 
have to have internalised the story.  So by the time you've clicked all the 
buttons and got the scenario you want, you've run through the story 
yourself. Because MARKAL effectively does the storytelling internally, 
someone else has to figure out what the story is, that's why I think it loses 
traction.” 
This quote resonates with many of the issues raised in this section and has 
important implications for the communication of the model outputs. 
4.3.1 Helping people understand what scenario modelling tells us 
The task of interpreting scenarios is not always straightforward. As Beven 
argued (Beven, 2009), reasoning based on a model of a system that is not 
validatable is ‘reasoning by analogy’. There are no definitive rules as to 
exactly what model dynamics should mean for the real world. Instead, there 
is a process of ‘translation’ from the modelled world into the real world of 
policy and decision-making.   
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This translation process is a matter of (subjective) judgement. The process 
involves producing outputs within the idealised world of the model, and then 
making judgements about what this might mean if the strict assumptions 
within the model were relaxed. As one interviewee described it:  
“Say, OK, we know the world’s not ideal, so let’s make it explicitly not 
ideal – let’s talk about the inability to get a long-term economically 
rational response from the population, or to overcome vested 
interests… or there is no access to capital.”  
This analysis has focused on two particular issues in this translation process:  
1. The character of the resulting scenarios (as positive or normative views 
about the future); and  
2. The relationship between the scenarios and probability.  
Scenarios as expected or desired futures 
Interviewees were asked whether MARKAL scenarios describe what is 
expected to happen (under a very specific set of circumstances) or what 
should happen?  Most participants indicated that neither was an accurate 
characterisation. The scenarios are “what could happen if” a whole range of 
assumptions turn out to be accurate.  Indeed, one might consider that the 
partial equilibrium paradigm of the model assumes that the most likely future 
is by definition also the most desirable: it is the optimal, welfare-maximising 
pathway in which producers and consumers maximise surplus in a perfectly 
competitive market.  
Language in the text of reports tends to frame system responses as what 
might be expected to happen. For example: “The model also enables us to 
consider what might happen if key technologies were not available or if 
society chose not to deploy them” (CCC, 2008) p. 81) and “The model is, 
however, very useful in illustrating the broad economic and structural impact 
of achieving our long-term targets for carbon emissions” (BERR, 2008) p. 
170). This is further reflected in descriptions of scenario exercises as “what if” 
processes, which is often taken to mean ‘what are the expected outcomes of 
a putative set of circumstances’.  
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Probability, plausibility and likelihood 
Both interview participants and documents steer clear of assigning 
information on perceived probabilities or likelihoods to scenario outcomes, 
and several participants suggested a degree of discomfort in attempts to do 
so.  
“I find talking about probabilities or likelihood is incredibly 
problematic.  I wouldn't do that in terms of delivery of policies or 
evolution of key aspects of the system.  I would much rather talk 
about, this output of the model is one point on the decision space.” 
Yet many participants described the scenarios as ‘plausible’. Following 
Morgan and Keith (2008), it is difficult to see what plausible means, other 
than that it meets some threshold level of subjective probability. In other 
words, scenarios are believed to be probable above some minimum 
threshold. Beyond this, interviewees differed in the degree to which they felt 
comfortable talking about likelihoods relating to scenario outputs. 
MARKAL provides detailed outputs in terms of the technology portfolio 
depicted in scenarios. Participants were asked: “If the model selects a 
particular technology, does that make you think that technology is more likely 
to ‘happen’ in the real world?” (see Appendices I and II). Participants varied in 
their immediate responses, with approximately equal numbers of ‘yes’ and 
‘no’ answers, as the following quotes illustrate:  
“Oooh, I don’t know. Yes. I’m not saying that it will happen, but given 
that the model thinks it’s an optimal method then I’d be interested in 
finding out why and whether that’s a reasonable result. So, my first 
instinct would be that it’s more likely to happen”. 
“No, because there are so many other factors that affect decision-
making” 
“My head would say no and my heart would say yes” 
Most went on to suggest that, where many runs are conducted and the 
technology appears across all of them, then the technology is perceived to be 
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more likely to emerge. But even then, interviewees qualified this by 
suggesting that many factors could mean that this is not a reliable result. In 
short, there is a high degree of caution in interpreting the technology-
specific results. As one modeller explained: 
“We’re never saying ‘now it’s twice as likely’, but we are saying it’s 
more or less likely.” 
One participant highlighted how technology-specific results should be 
understood as offering insights, rather than reflecting on the prospects of a 
specific technology.  
“If you start to see a particular technology coming through, then what 
that technology means is important. For example, lots of coal-to-
liquids starts to come through – that doesn’t necessarily mean that 
you’re going to start seeing lots of coal-to-liquids in the future, what 
it means is that oil becomes a more precious commodity.” 
Note that the availability bias suggests that technologies that are presented 
frequently in published runs will be believed to be more likely to occur, even 
when the model is not thought to be a reliable way of estimating the relative 
probability of particular technologies achieving success. This presents 
something of a dilemma: the importance of transparency (discussed further 
below) suggests that technology-specific outputs should in general be 
published; however, publishing these alongside the more reliable ‘insights’ 
may result in a misplaced degree of confidence in the prospects of particular 
technologies.  
Finally, two participants suggested that MARKAL scenarios carried sufficient 
power that scenarios of this kind could to some extent be self-fulfilling: 
technologies that frequently appear in runs may be seen as options that 
require policy support, making them more likely to be successfully developed 
and deployed. This echoes analysis of the role of visions and expectations in 
influencing the direction of innovation (McDowall, 2012; van Lente, 
1993)Trutnevyte, 2014). 
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4.3.2 Relationships and knowledge flows 
It is often assumed that knowledge and evidence flows from ‘modellers’ to 
‘policymakers’, and that these are relatively distinct groups. However, 
interviews revealed the close relationships between modellers and civil 
service experts.  These relationships contributed to a blurring of the 
distinction between those ‘producing’ and those ‘consuming’ the model 
outputs and scenarios.  The flow of information between ‘modellers’ and 
‘policymakers’ was not uni-linear as is often assumed, but rather 
multidirectional. Figure 4 provides a depiction of these complex relationships 
between ‘consumers’ and ‘producers’ of scenario-modelling processes. The 
figure also shows the links between modellers working within the UKERC 
systems theme, and others across UKERC.  
 
Figure 4. Co-production of knowledge: producers and consumers 
The important role of government analysts as conduits for MARKAL-derived 
insights was clear from interviews with civil servants. Analysts in government 
work closely with UKERC modellers, and are arguably more similar in role and 
outlook to academic modellers than they are to civil servants working in 
policy teams. Communication between modellers and this community of 
analysts is generally very good, and it is the analysts who mediate the flow of 
much model-based information through to policy teams.  
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The co-production of knowledge by both academics and civil servants was 
highlighted, contributing to a shared understanding of the model, the 
scenarios and creating a base of intelligent customers.  Despite this, some 
respondents also emphasised the importance of academic research that was 
independent of government funding; this was argued to enable the 
exploration of scenarios beyond those that solely focused on the short-term 
needs of policymakers. As one academic explained:  
“Being academics, and academics with sources of funding that do not 
depend on government departments, you try to do two things: you try 
to set up model runs to look at things that policy makers are really 
interested in...  At the same time, we're academics so we say long-
term targets are really hard or if you haven't built anything by 2025 
then it’s not going to happen, or independence of Scotland means 
you'll have to think not just about who owns the oil, but who owns the 
wires and how much power is going to flow north to south.”    
The process and practice of engagement with policymakers had changed over 
time.  Interviewees explained that when MARKAL was first used in policy to 
model the energy system (i.e. rather than used as a decision-making tool for 
research and development), understanding of the model (paradigm) was very 
poor.  According to one participant, even the ‘brightest minds’ in the Cabinet 
Office were unable to grasp certain aspects of the model.  Recognising the 
need for greater stakeholder engagement, for the publication of the 2003 
Energy White Paper and in subsequent years, considerable effort was made to 
engage a wider stakeholder audience in data validation processes.  This 
engagement was perceived to be largely successful, creating acceptance of 
the model paradigm and leading to a greater understanding of the model.  
Although this process of active engagement with stakeholders had declined 
somewhat, particularly as familiarity with the model increased, this process of 
engagement with policy audiences continues today, albeit under a different 
guise.  Interviewees highlighted the close relationships between members of 
the modelling team and those within the analytical teams at the CCC and 
DECC.  As DECC (and other government departments) had (re)built their 
analytical capabilities, leading to increased internal modelling expertise, the 
conversation between modellers at UKERC and civil service experts had 
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become more ‘sophisticated’.  Many of the interviewees also referred to the 
ability of this group of actors to ask ‘intelligent questions’ of the models, 
which had also facilitated the communication process.  Increasingly, it was 
this community of analysts who mediated the flow of much model-based 
information through to policy teams yet this group of analysts was still small 
and embryonic.  This meant that, despite increased expertise within 
government, there remains a wider orbit of users who are unable to or 
uninterested in developing personal or expert links with the modelling team.  
For this wider audience to make appropriate use of scenarios, interviewees 
highlighted the importance of providing clarity on key assumptions.   
It is worth noting that, while the project was focused on the use of the 
MARKAL model, interviewees rarely limited the conversation to this model 
alone; rather, respondents frequently referred to other models and tools – 
such as ESME, TIMES and DECC’s 2050 Calculator – and the relative strengths 
and weaknesses of these different approaches.  The complexity, diffusion of 
expertise and vintage of the MARKAL model was often referred to by those 
working for government.  For example, one civil servant explained that an 
attraction of ESME was that the knowledge was concentrated – there was ‘one 
core guy’, rather than expertise being more widely distributed; this sentiment 
was echoed by others working in government.  
4.3.3 Uncertainty and confidence 
Participants expressed a range of views about how well UKERC scenario work 
has represented and communicated uncertainty.  Overall, the participants 
reflected the view that this is an area in which there is considerable room for 
improvement. However, reflection and criticism of previous practice was 
tempered by the acknowledgement from all participants of the very 
substantial challenges associated with adequately grappling with uncertainty 
in systems analysis and long-term projections.  
One civil servant highlighted that this is not a problem restricted to MARKAL, 
and that analysis within government is typically poor at representing 
uncertainty effectively: 
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“I get frustrated by our [government analysts] lack of presenting 
uncertainty…The MARKAL analysis sometimes does better than we 
have. The charts often did overlay a whole stack of different runs on 
the thing we were measuring, which helps you to see that its uncertain. 
The awkward thing is that there is always a core MARKAL run around 
which you are varying the assumptions, and that core one gets taken 
to be the one that we should pay the most attention to, as opposed to 
the ranges to which you should pay attention to.” 
Several interviewees suggested that the scenario approach used, in which a 
relatively small number of scenarios are generated, representing 
perturbations around a ‘reference’ and ‘core low carbon’ case, was not always 
well suited to providing a true picture of uncertainty. This was both because it 
was seen to be a limited ‘sampling’ of the uncertainty space, but also because 
of the way in which ‘consumers’ of scenarios tend to focus on a central 
scenario as being the ‘most likely’. As one civil servant put it: 
“Uncertainty is presented, but not confronted by government because 
the centre scenario is also presented and that becomes the anchor.” 
Several participants, modellers and civil servants, noted that no systematic 
attempt has been made to assess and communicate the parametric 
uncertainties to which the model outcomes are most sensitive. Some 
participants suggested that this was not wholly necessary, because expert 
modellers had performed so many different scenarios, they had an intuitive 
grasp of what the most important parameter uncertainties really are. This was 
however raised by civil servants, one of whom said:  
“You'll pick a set of key outputs that you most care about, see what 
they're most sensitive to …Then you focus your attention on reviewing 
those systematically.  We haven't done that with ESME or MARKAL - we 
haven't had the time, but that's what we're doing with other models 
built internally and that's what I'd like to do.  Then you can present to 
policymakers and be very clear - this is the advice we're giving you, the 
5 biggest degrees of uncertainty are this, this, this and this…. When 
presenting the results to policymakers we need to know what the big 
uncertainties are, what the model is most sensitive to - I don't feel we 
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can do that with ESME, MARKAL, TIMES at the moment and I don't 
really like that”.   
Treatment in the text: what uncertainties are discussed? 
The literature suggests that frequently parameter uncertainty is a greater 
focus of discussion than model uncertainty (e.g. Kloprogge et al., 1982). The 
present analysis documented discussion of uncertainties, categorising these 
as relating to various aspects of parameter and model uncertainty. The 
documents reviewed for this analysis suggests a more balanced treatment 
than that described by Kloprogge et al. (1982), with approximately equal 
numbers of mentions of parameter uncertainties and uncertainties relating to 
model structure, decision-rule and system boundaries. However, when 
examining uncertainties reported in the conclusion and executive summary 
sections of documents, this was much more skewed towards parameter 
uncertainties. This suggests that, despite relatively even treatment overall, 
more prominence is given to parameter uncertainties by virtue of where they 
are typically presented and discussed.  
Parameter uncertainties are frequently acknowledged in general terms, with 
documents noting that the future values of many parameters are uncertain. 
Beyond this, documents often highlight particular parameters, most 
frequently uncertainties regarding the costs of particular technologies 
(typically CCS and nuclear), and global energy prices.  Less frequently 
identified parameter uncertainties include the values of elasticities, price and 
availability of international CO2 trading, bioenergy availability, hurdle rates, 
build-rates and market-share constraints, and the stringency of targets.  The 
availability heuristic suggests that parameters mentioned most frequently will 
be perceived by readers as those thought to be most important, i.e. those to 
which model outcomes are most sensitive, regardless of whether this is in 
fact true.  
‘Surprises’ are not frequently discussed in reports. This is largely because 
“surprising” a perfect-foresight model is not straightforward. However, a risk 
with the narrative neglect of surprise events is that such events become 
hidden (the availability heuristic again), and believed to be less likely than 
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they really are. A basic problem here is that events deemed too implausible to 
include within a scenario occur all too often. As one scenario user put it:  
“Things happen in real life that are outside of the reasonable ranges to 
run in models. In the space of five years we’ve seen a few of those 
things happen” (Shale gas, Fukushima, fall in PV costs, etc).  
This suggests that the scale of uncertainty associated with parameter values 
is often larger than is assessed in sensitivity runs.  
Uncertainties relating to the structure of the model generally fall into three 
categories. First, there are issues that are simply acknowledged to be outside 
the scope of the model system. These include various aspects of behaviour 
and consumer preference, political and cultural factors, issues related to 
industrial capacity and supply chains, and trade and competitiveness issues. 
The uncertainties here relate to the relative significance of these out-of-
scope issues on the evolution of the model. These issues are widely discussed 
in the documents, but not always in the context of uncertainty – rather noting 
that something has not been taken into account. It is worth noting that these 
types of issues are disproportionately reported in report appendices, which 
may obscure them to many readers.  Second, and discussed as frequently, are 
the various ways in which the model structure is recognised to be a 
simplification of a more complex reality. Choices are made as to how to 
manage the balance between model detail and model simplicity, for example 
relating to spatial detail or temporal resolution. Third, and discussed 
somewhat less, is the extent to which perfect foresight optimisation is an 
appropriate decision-rule.  
Uncertainty, action and policy relevance 
It is a frequent lament of those trying to communicate uncertainties that 
decision-makers will reject as ‘unhelpful’ analysis that emphasises the high 
degree of uncertainty in the results.  
In an early meeting [a civil servant] said something to me which was 
quite telling, something along the lines of… ‘we know the world is 
hugely uncertain and we know we have little surety about a lot of this in 
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terms of policy mechanism and their effectiveness over time, but we 
need models to simplify the world for us and it makes the world feel a 
more manageable place’.  So there’s a suspension of the messy realities, 
a conscious exercise within the policy community just to make the 
project do-able, because there’s a danger of uncertainties – and this is a 
danger for the UKERC uncertainties project – to disempower the political 
and policy project by articulating the uncertainties. 
4.3.4 Transparency 
Transparency has been highlighted as a key issue within the literature on use 
and communication of models in policymaking. This was echoed by 
participants, who agreed that transparency is important.  However, it is also 
clear that achieving transparency is not always simple. As one interviewee put 
it:  
“There is a view that if you put everything on a website then you’ve 
made it more transparent, because everything is available. But a piece 
of code in a big database is meaningless, because no-one knows what 
to do with it and it’s very difficult to scrutinise”. 
Participants described a variety of ways in which transparency is achieved: 
- The fact that the underlying model code is internationally shared 
through the IEA’s ETSAP, creates a community of modellers 
internationally who understand and use the same model framework. 
This provides a degree of transparency to the overall modelling 
paradigm.  
- The second aspect is transparency about the basic rules by which the 
model operates, through optimisation, which is conceptually 
straightforward and therefore relatively easy to explain. 
- Transparency is achieved through cultivating an expert community of 
users – i.e. through working closely with those using the models to 
ensure that they are intelligent consumers of model outputs.  
- Linking the data in the model to the underlying assumptions and 
intuitive units. “For example, if you look at the cost of a gas boiler in 
MARKAL, the number is meaningless to a modeller and depends on a 
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number of assumptions, in UK TIMES you can link it back to a 
spreadsheet and its clear how that’s represented” 
- The final aspect is to make data and assumptions transparent, through 
publications and the model documentation, and also through expert 
workshops. 
- A distinction was also made between transparency of model inputs 
(through documentation) and transparency in model outputs.  
Several participants highlighted the challenges of aiming for transparency in 
the context of a model that is, in the words of one participant, “extremely 
data hungry”.  Several participants noted that this limits the capacity of 
modellers to provide opportunities for scrutiny of the data and assumptions, 
noting, for example, “you try to have the different data as transparent as you 
can, but it’s a really big data set so there are limits to that”.   
Moreover, several highlighted the fact that in any give set of runs, many of 
the assumptions will have little or no effect on the model solution. It is often 
difficult for experienced modellers to identify the particular assumption that 
is driving a model result. As one participant explained, an inevitable risk with 
data transparency is that: 
“people focus on certain things and ignore [other] things that are 
equally important; equally they can get hung up on things that don’t 
matter at all”. 
Ultimately, argued one interviewee, the impossibility of complete data 
transparency results in a need for trust: 
“it’s not possible to say it all and start from scratch [when explaining 
model results and underlying assumptions]. There’s an element of 
trust – an underlying core of data. Trust us, it’s basically OK” 
It was generally felt that there had been consistent efforts to improve 
transparency, but also that there is room for improvement. 
“I think that some of our model documentation where you might want 
your reference material to be that people can look at, I don’t think 
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that’s altogether transparent and could be made better…. Clearly it’s a 
reference document, but I wonder whether more could be done”,  
The same interviewee also acknowledged that this would be both a time-
consuming and tedious task, a sentiment echoed by others.  One interviewee 
highlighted that there are things that are simply not documented clearly:  
“there's a 150 page document…here's what the model is and it lists 
lots of the assumptions.  I think that a lot of the assumptions aren't 
mentioned, such as we put constraints on certain things and don't say 
this is a constraint, this is driving results in this sector.” 
The interviewee later noted:  
“There's few rewards for doing the underlying data work, data review. 
The documentation was such a hassle, and its unpleasant task” 
Several interviewees noted that transparency takes time, and that there is a 
trade-off with other activities. Producing written documentation was also 
seen as important, but perhaps less directly useful than having the capacity 
to inform scenario users directly:  
“when you have a 150 page document on documentation and on page 
80 you mention technology specific hurdle rates, that they're the same 
for all transport technologies and here they are, such an important 
assumption but it’s not highlighted and you'd never know it unless you 
went looking for it.  That's where experience, and people experienced 
with the models, comes in - that's why whenever someone has a 
question about ETM, the easiest way to communicate is to ask a 
specific question to the person who is available to answer it.  Trying to 
write a document that can answer every single question in every single 
sector is not possible.” 
Civil servant perspectives on model transparency 
Civil servants tended to describe the model and outputs as less transparent 
than modellers. For example, two interviewees described the model as a 
‘black box’, with one explaining by saying that “because [it’s] an optimisation 
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model you can’t follow through transparently how the inputs get to the 
outputs”; this relates to the importance of story-telling.  A third civil servant 
said:  
“The term bandied about is ‘black box’, its perceived as being a black 
box. It’s not quite a black box, you can open it and have a look inside, 
but its hard work and the number of people in DECC who can open the 
box was zero and now its half to one person who is confident enough 
to do that.”  
Similarly, another civil servant said: 
“we need to find a way of mining the constraints within the model that 
doesn’t require a PhD. In MARKAL that’s impossible; TIMES is better 
but it’s still complicated. It needs a cleaner interface and [it] is 
insufficiently slick”.  
Another civil servant also highlighted that perceptions of transparency are 
related to the relationships and knowledge that government analysts have 
with the workings of the model, exemplified in the following quote:  
“I still have discomfort about using these models that are…I haven’t 
been involved in building, that are big and unwieldy. In my head, 
there’s a lot of uncertainty about what’s gone into building them, I 
haven’t gone through in detail MARKAL. Part of the reason we at DECC 
are getting involved early in UK TIMES and being more involved is so 
that we can be more confident in the conclusions and the whole 
modelling strategy.” 
This was echoed by a second civil servant: 
“Another issue that MARKAL and other models suffer from – 
particularly ones that are long in the tooth – is that they’ve become 
moribund. There is no one person who now knows all of it. From a 
MacPherson point of view that is a bit of a disaster. We’re now running 
around with effectively a non-compliant model” 
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The process for government analysts understanding assumptions was also 
revealed to be less straightforward than simple claims of ‘transparency’ might 
imply:  
“we will attempt to review [the assumptions] by forming a committee 
who will attempt to triangulate and who will find it hard to work out 
what the assumption is in MARKAL and what it means and what DECC’s 
assumptions are, and it’s very hard to reconcile the two in the time 
available.” 
Challenges associated with transparency were certainly not seen as being 
solely the responsibility of academics, however. Civil servants also described 
challenges in rendering analysis transparent to others. One said:  
“In general, we haven’t cracked the nut of publishing data and 
assumptions in formats that are actually at all useful to anyone else  - 
we’re really bad at that”.  
Transparency, credibility and model complexity 
It is generally agreed that the more complex the model, the harder it is to be 
transparent, and this idea was borne out by the views of interviewees as 
noted above. Several felt that the technological detail of the model was 
excessive. Civil servant interviewees in particular suggested that MARKAL was 
perceived to be too complex:  
“MARKAL’s become a bit bloated after 10-15 years of use... do you 
really need nine different types of nuclear power plant, do you really 
need six different types of fridges and freezers?” 
One civil servant suggested that greater simplicity was useful not only for 
ensuring transparency but also facilitated model credibility for DECC users:  
“One of the key things for people in DECC to take notice is are you 
consistent with the very latest assumptions.  Whether that's pertinent 
to the question you're asking, its a credibility issue that you can't 
avoid.  Therefore the task of updating a whole suite of assumptions is 
so much simpler when you have one nuclear power point, and only put 
82 
 
82 
 
in an extra level of detail when it truly impacts the question at hand.  
Because credibility is the most important thing.” 
However, civil servants also highlighted the demands for greater detail, in 
particular from policy teams working on specific technology areas, for whom 
technology detail is an important credibility test.  
Transparency reflected in reports 
In contrast to the complex picture provided by interviewees, the text analysis 
revealed a rather simple approach to describing transparency. Documents 
tended to assert either that the model and analysis is transparent, or that it is 
not.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, reports to government from researchers, and 
government documents making use of the model, assert transparency. For 
example: “Principal advantages to be derived from using the MARKAL energy 
systems model include:… [it is a] Transparent framework; open assumptions 
on data, technology pathways, constraints etc;” (Strachan et al., 2008) p.6), 
and “The MARKAL-MACRO model has both strengths and weaknesses. …its 
assumptions on data, technology pathways and constraints are transparent” 
(BERR, 2008) p. 158).  In contrast, documents promoting alternative analytic 
techniques highlight the lack of transparency in MARKAL: “Cost optimising 
models (e.g. MARKAL) are good at answering the “What is the least cost 
pathway to 2050?” question, but are less suited to performing scenario 
analysis and their ‘black box nature’” makes them difficult to communicate to 
non-experts.” (DECC and DfID, 2013)p. 8). 
Detailed assumptions tend to be reported only where they have direct bearing 
on the scenarios generated in the report. Typically, readers are directed to 
model documentation and earlier reports for further detail.   For example, a 
report published in 2013 states: “The assumptions are numerous and can be 
complex; only those that are relevant to the scenario comparison being 
carried out here are described in this report” (UKERC 2013). 
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4.3.5 Texts, language and messaging: practical insights into how we present 
outputs  
Progressive disclosure of information: what information is disclosed where?  
Kloprogge et al.’s guide to communication (Kloprogge et al., 2007) highlights 
that attention must be paid to reporting the right kind of information in the 
right place. The review of texts conducted in this study indicated that in 
general, the ‘outer’ layers of reports (such as executive summary and 
conclusions) do generally contain information appropriate to wider audiences 
and more general messages, while more detailed and technical issues are 
described in the main body of the report and in technical appendices. 
However, there are exceptions in which outer layers describe the results of 
the modelling exercises without providing sufficient uncertainty information. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, policy documents tend to put in the foreground a 
depiction of results that is more certain than that depicted further inside 
reports. For example, the summary section of the Climate Change Act Impact 
Assessment describes the costs of achieving the 2050 carbon targets as 
‘indicative estimates’, and reports the costs to three significant figures.  In 
the main body of the evidence, the language is rather less confident: “the 
modelling results cited are intended only to illustrate possible costs rather 
than predict precise outcomes” (DECC, 2009b).  
Providing guidance on interpretation alongside caveats. In general, 
documents do provide guidance on interpretation associated with caveats or 
uncertainties, for example noting that the implication of a particular issue 
might be the over- or under-estimation of a variable. However, analysis of 
texts also identified several cases of caveats or limitations with no guidance 
to the reader on what such limitations might mean for interpretation. 
Examples include statements such as “Given that these results are at the 
extreme limit of what the model can achieve in terms of abatement, they 
need to be interpreted with care” (Pye et al., 2008).  Such statements are 
unhelpfully ambiguous, which Kloprogge et al. (2007) suggest can mean that 
those who like the results will ignore the uncertainty, while those who dislike 
the results will seize on such ambiguity as a reason to reject the results 
outright.  
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Language and jargon. Civil servants with whom we spoke expressed different 
views about the use of jargon, but there was clearly some concern. Kloprogge 
et al. (2007) suggest that jargon should be avoided in ‘outer’ layers and 
communications which are intended for non-specialist audiences.  
Analysis of documents found that a standard phraseology is often used to 
describe the model. The following phrase appears in seven of the documents 
reviewed, of which five were reports to government: “MARKAL is a widely-
applied bottom-up, dynamic, linear programming (LP) optimisation model.”  
Use of common phraseology is of course in itself unproblematic. However, 
civil servant participants expressed some concern about policymaker 
understanding of terms such as ‘dynamic’ (which was seen as being open to a 
wide range of interpretations) and it was generally agreed that ‘linear 
programming’ was likely not to be understood by many civil servants. These 
terms typically appear in methodology sections, but are also found in the 
executive summary and introduction sections.  ‘Perfect foresight’, another 
term that might be considered jargon, was thought to be more widely 
understood, but was also described as being open to misinterpretation by 
people across the civil service outside analyst teams. One civil servant 
indicated that it is often difficult to know whether people really understand 
the issues or not, a sentiment that was echoed by others: 
“I’m not sure whether people really know what they’re saying or are 
just too embarrassed to say ‘hang on I don’t understand this’.  There 
must be elements of both”. 
This analysis suggests that more care should be taken in written documents, 
ensuring that technical terms stay out of the parts of report designed to be 
absorbed by a less expert reader (such as the executive summary). It may 
also be worthwhile to develop a short glossary of terms.  This is common in 
policy documents, but has not been common practice in the reports reporting 
MARKAL-derived scenarios.  
Quantitative information and uncertainty communication. While there are 
exceptions, quantitative outputs are often reported to a high degree of 
precision. This occurs both in ‘inner’ and in ‘outer’ PDI layers. It is 
recommended that more thought is given to the presentation of quantitative 
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outputs, and in particular that outputs are reported to a lower degree of 
precision than is typically the case. Several participants highlighted this as a 
potential problem, suggesting that excess precision in reported results is not 
only meaningless, it can be misleading by conveying too great a perception of 
accuracy.  As one civil servant said: 
“There’s a challenge in that what those long-term energy models do is 
provide insights, but they also provide very exact numbers to as many 
decimal places as you’d like.  I think this is spurious accuracy, [and] then 
it’s possible to become fixated on the numbers rather than the insights 
that are developed”.   
Concerns were also raised about the kinds of graphical information that is 
presented in MARKAL reports.  
“I’m constantly amazed by how crap the charts are….  A great example is 
that we’re fond of using charts that show energy usage over time, split by 
different sectors or fuels.  They’re stacked line charts, and it’s virtually 
impossible to understand whether or not a line that’s floating in the air is 
higher or lower than the one that’s floating in the middle of the air 5 time 
units ago.  They look beautiful, but I’m not sure how much they add to 
people’s knowledge.” 
4.4 Discussion 
In the decade since the 2003 Energy White Paper, the UK MARKAL model has 
become an important tool, providing ‘analytical underpinning’ and an 
evidence base for energy policy (Strachan et al., 2008).  Reflecting UKERC’s 
whole systems perspective, MARKAL has also played an important role in the 
Centre’s research, one that has provided elements of a unifying vision and 
framework for thinking about transitions to a future, low carbon energy 
system.  As UKERC moves on to a third phase, we are provided with a timely 
opportunity to reflect on the use of scenarios and energy system models in 
informing policy and research more broadly.  Drawing on document analysis 
and interviews, this part of the research investigated the communication and 
use of scenarios derived from energy system models, particularly MARKAL.   
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The task of interpreting scenarios is not always straightforward. As Beven 
argued (Beven 2009), reasoning based on a model of a system that is not 
validatable is ‘reasoning by analogy’. There are no definitive rules as to 
exactly what model dynamics should mean for the real world. Instead, there 
is a process of ‘translation’ from the modelled world into the real world of 
policy and decision-making.  This translation process is a matter of 
(subjective) judgement. Modellers are often cautious about how definitive to 
be in this translation process. This includes caution about whether to present 
model results as having normative or positive implications (i.e. whether 
scenarios represent things that perhaps should be done; or things that that 
might be expected under certain conditions). There is also caution around 
expressing degrees of likelihood associated with scenarios. This caution is 
understandable, but results in an ambiguity about the meaning of results that 
creates risks for their subsequent use. The existence of the ‘confirmation 
bias’, studied in cognitive psychology, suggests that ambiguous information, 
in which the degree of uncertainty or knowledge about the degree of 
uncertainty is left unstated, tends to result in people either a) rejecting the 
information if they don’t like it or b) seizing on it as proof that they’re right if 
they do like it. Ideally, more time and effort should be dedicated to thinking 
about and communicating the implications of results. 
This research has shown that, in general, MARKAL and other system models 
have been used appropriately, and model outputs have been communicated 
in a responsible and appropriate way, despite some recognition that model 
results had been used on occasion to ‘provide political cover’. There was 
general agreement on the value of models like MARKAL in opening up and 
thinking about the evolution of the energy system, providing a source of 
‘conceptual learning’ for policymakers. Indeed, the interviews appear to 
suggest a greater sense of confidence in the value of such tools for 
supporting conceptual learning than they do in providing ‘instrumental 
learning’ (in which knowledge directly informs concrete decisions; (Hertin et 
al., 2009)). In particular, MARKAL had been used to examine interactions 
across the energy system, possible pathways to decarbonisation, and the 
impacts of (sometimes competing) policy goals and objectives; these were 
broadly reflected in the UK policy documents analysed for this report.  A 
number of broad insights from scenario-modelling processes were identified, 
87 
 
87 
 
including feasibility of a transition to a low carbon energy future, the 
importance of power sector decarbonisation and demand reduction, and the 
requirement for a mixed portfolio of technologies.  Policymakers are widely 
thought to have used model results appropriately most of the time. 
The wider literature on systems models emphasises the importance of 
transparency as a basic criterion of quality, this was similarly recognised to 
be difficult.  There is a clear trade-off between making the models fully 
transparent (e.g. documenting all assumptions and data sources) and time 
spent constructing and analysing the scenarios and other outputs.  Within 
Government, MARKAL was seen as unnecessarily complex, thus hindering 
transparency.  This highlights the multi-layered nature of transparency, and 
the ongoing challenges that this presents. 
This research also revealed that a clear delimitation between ‘producers’ and 
‘consumers’ of energy system models is inaccurate, and a poor model of how 
policymakers actually access model-based insights.  The flow of knowledge 
between academic modellers and those working in policy was not uni-linear 
and communication was generally regarded to be good, facilitated through 
strong working relationships.  In particular, the role of analysts within 
government was highlighted, since it is these individuals who mediate the 
flow of information derived from scenario modelling processes through to 
policy teams.  This has implications for the communication of scenarios not 
co-produced with government analysts.  The need to ‘tell a story’ with the 
outputs of scenario modelling processes emerges as an important finding, 
with more effort needed in communicating the big picture, rather than 
producing detailed outputs. Finally, the research found that good practice 
was generally followed in reports and other documentation, in terms of 
providing appropriate contextual and qualifying information. 
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5. Conclusions 
The project has provided a reflection on the use of scenario methods across 
the UKERC systems theme, with a particular focus in Section 5 on the use of a 
core UKERC tool, the MARKAL model. The project has highlighted many 
strengths of the UKERC approach and, as UKERC enters Phase 3, offers 
suggestions on how to improve on the development, use and communication 
of scenarios.  
The diversity and range of methods and approaches developed within UKERC 
is valuable, and should be fostered further. Too narrow a range of techniques 
and teams developing scenarios would risk constraining the ability of UKERC 
to open up thinking to a wide range of possibilities, perspectives and 
framings, which history suggests is important.  UKERC scenarios have tended 
to be dominated by perfect foresight optimisation, by futures in which 
mitigation goals are met, and by futures in which scenario differences are 
driven by policy or technology, though there are of course exceptions. As 
UKERC Phase 3 begins, there is a case for reflecting further on the range and 
type of uncertainties addressed within energy system scenarios, and the 
diversity of techniques and perspectives represented. Future work might 
usefully include examination of scenarios in which mitigation goals are not 
met or are only partially met, a wider range of scenario tools and techniques, 
as well as greater attention to social, political and institutional uncertainties 
alongside technology and policy.  
A core tool of the UKERC systems theme has been the UK MARKAL model. The 
research undertaken for this project indicates that MARKAL has generally 
been used and communicated appropriately, in part because of good working 
relationships between government analysts and UKERC researchers. While 
examples were noted of occasions on which model outputs have been used 
within government as post hoc justification rather than to substantively 
inform the policy process, these are believed to be the exceptions. There are 
also areas in which there is room for improvement, and UKERC Phase 3 
provides an opportunity to learn the lessons from previous experience.  
89 
 
89 
 
Three areas were particularly highlighted where efforts could be focused. 
First, it was acknowledged that both the nature of MARKAL modelling 
(producing detailed scenarios based on a ‘reference case’) and the practice of 
communication may have served to downplay the extent of uncertainties 
involved in the ongoing development of the UK energy system. While 
adequately representing uncertainty is acknowledged to be extremely 
difficult, both modellers and civil servants identified ways to improve both the 
incorporation of uncertainty into model use and the representation of 
uncertainty in published outputs.   
Second, the importance and challenges of transparency were highlighted. It 
was recognised that there was both a perception of low transparency by many 
outside the modelling community, and that despite efforts to provide detailed 
documentation, past practice in terms of publishing detailed assumptions 
had not always been as good as might be desirable. These challenges have 
been mitigated in the past through close working relationships between 
analysts working in government (both in DECC and in the committee on 
climate change). In future, the development of UK TIMES is an opportunity to 
further extend transparency of energy system modelling.  
Finally, various aspects of the communication of scenario outputs were 
highlighted as areas for future improvement. Greater care could be taken with 
the use of jargon, with excessive precision in the reporting of quantitative 
outputs, and with explaining the implications of key caveats for model 
interpretation.  
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Appendix 1. Interview protocol: policymakers 
1. Can you tell us a little bit about your professional background and your 
role within [organisation]? 
2. What are the key policy questions that can be informed by a scenario-
modelling process using a MARKAL-type model?  
a. What kinds of answers does it provide?  
b. Modellers often talk about “insights, not numbers”, can you give 
examples of the kind of insights that have been drawn from 
working with UK MARKAL? 
c. What kinds of misconceptions are there about this? 
3. At what stage of the policy cycle is a scenario-modelling process most 
useful and/ or most often used? Issue identification and scoping? 
Supporting specific decisions? Both? 
4. In your experience of interacting with and observing policy processes, how 
are scenarios and results actually used and understood in practice? 
a. Can you think of examples where a scenario/ model-based 
exercises has been misinterpreted or oversold? 
5. Are scenarios generated by MARKAL better understood as what is 
expected to happen under a given set of circumstances, or as what should 
happen? For example, if a constraint is introduced to force the model to 
meet a 2030 renewable energy target, are the relative changes against a 
base case illustrative of what might be expected to occur if such a target 
were implemented, or do they depict what policymakers should aim to 
facilitate? 
6. If the model selects a particular technology, does that make you think that 
technology is more likely to happen in the real world?  
7. Communication 
a) Where do you go to find insights, reports and scenarios? How do 
you access these? 
b) How do you prioritise the assumptions that you need to 
understand? 
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c) Given that modellers emphasise ‘insights, not numbers’ what 
does that mean for the way we communicate quantitative 
outputs?   
d) Who do you ask/ turn to for further guidance on key 
assumptions? 
e) Do you read reports cover to cover?  
f) Jargon? 
8. Are scenario reports open about the range of uncertainties and our 
fundamental ignorance about how the future will unfold? Do they convey 
too great a sense of confidence? 
THANK AND CLOSE 
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Appendix 2. Interview protocol: researchers 
1. Can you tell us a little bit about your professional background and your role 
within [organisation]? 
2. How do you describe MARKAL and the scenario modelling process when you 
introduce it to a policy audience? 
3. What are the key policy questions that can be informed by a scenario-
modelling process using a MARKAL-type model?  
a. What kinds of answers does a scenario-modelling process provide?  
b. “Throughout this track record there has been a tension between 
policymakers who require specific answers and modellers whose 
analytic outputs are designed to give insights”, how does that work 
in the UK policy context? 
c. Modellers often talk about “insights, not numbers”, can you give 
examples of the kind of insights that have been drawn from 
working with UK MARKAL? What kinds of misconceptions are there 
about this? 
4. In your experience of interacting with and observing policy processes, how 
are scenarios and results actually used and understood in practice? 
a. Can you think of examples where a scenario/ model-based 
exercises has been misinterpreted or oversold? 
b. How does the interaction process work?  
5. It is not always easy to ‘translate’ between what happens in the model ‘world’ 
and what this means in the real world. In particular, people sometimes seem 
to shift between different views on whether scenarios generated by MARKAL 
better understood as what is expected to happen under a given set of 
circumstances, or as what should happen.  
a. For example, if a constraint is introduced to force the model to 
meet a 2030 renewable energy target, are the relative changes 
against a base case illustrative of what might be expected to occur 
if such a target were implemented, or do they depict what 
policymakers should aim to facilitate? 
b. How do you navigate this ‘translation’?  What should we be doing to 
help people? 
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6. If the model selects a particular technology, does that make you think that 
technology is more likely to happen in the real world?  
a. When we say that something is ‘robust’ across runs, we imply that 
this is a likely outcome of a set of policies – how do we begin to 
communicate the degree of confidence we have in such beliefs? 
7. What strategies do you use to capture and express the range of uncertainties 
involved in energy system scenarios? What improvements can we make to 
doing this better?  
8. Communication and engagement with policymakers and other ‘users’ of 
scenarios 
a. Transparency is generally agreed to be important: how do you 
prioritise which assumptions are highlighted and communicated?  
Do you do this consciously? 
b. Given that modellers emphasise ‘insights, not numbers’ what does 
that mean for the way we communicate quantitative outputs?   
THANK AND CLOSE 
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Appendix 3. Table of UKERC 2 Scenarios 
 
Author 
(s) (Yr) 
Scenario titles Key variables used for constructing scenarios 
CO2 emission 
constraints by 
2050 
Policies Fossil 
fuel 
price 
Technology or 
resource choice, 
availability or 
readiness 
Other 
Anandarajah and 
Strachan (2010) 
1.Reference scenario None 
RO1 5%; 
RTO2 15% 
   
2. Low carbon scenario -80% 
RO1 5%; 
RTO2 15% 
   
3. Renewable policy 
scenario, including 3 
variants of policy mixes 
None 
RO1 15-50%; 
RTO2 5-20%; 
RHP3 20% 
   
4. Low carbon renewable 
scenarios, including 3 
variants of policy mixes 
-80%  
RO1 15-50%; 
RTO2 5-20%; 
RHP3 20% 
   
Chaudry et al. 
(2011); Skea et 
al. (2011) 
1. Reference case None 
‘Firm’ policies 
only 
   
2. Low carbon system -80%     
3. Resilient system     
Resilience 
to shocks 
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2. Low carbon and 
resilient system 
-80%    
Resilience 
to shocks 
Anandarajah et 
al. (2011); 
Anandarajah et 
al. (2009); 
Ekins et al. 
(2011a) 
1. Base reference None     
2. Faint-heart -40%      
3. Low carbon -60%      
4. Ambition -80%      
6. Super ambition -90%      
7. Ambition with early 
action 
-80%    
Early 
action 
8. Low carbon, least-cost 
pathway 
Cumulative  
as in -80% 
   
Least-cost 
pathway 
9. Low carbon, social 
discount rate 
Cumulative  
as in -80% 
   
Social 
discount 
rate 
Ekins et al. 
(2011b) 
1. Baseline with medium 
fossil fuel price 
 
‘Firm’ policies 
only 
Medium   
2. Baseline with low fossil 
fuel price 
 
‘Firm’ policies 
only 
Low   
3. Baseline with medium 
high fuel price 
 
‘Firm’ policies 
only 
High   
4. ETR4 with medium fossil 
fuel price 
 New green taxes  Medium   
5.  ETR4 with low fossil 
fuel price 
 New green taxes Low   
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6. Eco-innovation scenario 
with medium fossil fuel 
price 
 
New green taxes 
with revenue 
allocation to 
innovation 
Medium   
7. Eco-innovation scenario 
with low fossil fuel price 
 
New green taxes 
with revenue 
allocation to 
innovation 
Low   
Ekins et al. 
(2013) 
 
(UKERC Phase 2 
scenarios only) 
1. Reference case, 
including 2 variants with 
gas price coupled and 
decoupled 
- ‘Firm’ policies    
2. Additional measures, 
including 2 variants with 
gas price coupled and 
decoupled) 
- 
‘Firm’ policies 
and additional 
announced 
policies 
   
3. Policy gap, including 2 
variants with gas price 
coupled and decoupled) 
-70%     
4. Low carbon, including 2 
variants with gas price 
coupled and decoupled) 
-80%     
5. Reference case, 
including 2 variants with 
- ‘Firm’ policies   
Diversity 
target  
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gas price coupled and 
decoupled) 
6. Additional measures, 
including 2 variants with 
gas price coupled and 
decoupled) 
- 
‘Firm’ policies 
and additional 
announced 
policies 
  
Diversity 
target 
7. Policy gap, including 2 
variants with gas price 
coupled and decoupled) 
-70%    
Diversity 
target 
8. Low carbon, including 2 
variants with gas price 
coupled and decoupled) 
-80%    
Diversity 
target 
Kannan (2011) 
1. Base case, including 5 
technology variants 
   
No plug-in hybrid 
vehicles; 
No storage heaters; 
No demand side 
storage; 
No storage; 
Only hydrogen-based 
storage 
 
2. Emission reduction 
scenario, including 5 
technology variants 
-60%   
No plug-in hybrid 
vehicles; 
No storage heaters; 
No demand side 
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storage; 
No storage; 
Only hydrogen-based 
storage 
Markusson and 
Haszeldine 
(2010) 
1. New plants, CCS5 ready  
New plants, 
capture ready 
 CCS5works  
2. New plants, CCS5 ready  
New plants, 
capture ready 
 CCS5 does not work  
3.New plants, not CCS5 
ready 
 
New plants, not 
capture ready 
 CCS5 works  
4.New plants, not CCS5 
ready 
 
New plants, not 
capture ready 
 CCS5 does not work  
5.No new plants  No new plants  CCS5works  
6.No new plants  No new plants  CCS5 does not work  
McGlade and 
Ekins (2014) 
1. Low carbon society with 
CCS 
≤425 ppm 
CO2 
  CCS5 available  
2.  Low carbon society, no 
CCS 
≤425 ppm 
CO2 
  CCS5 not available  
Strachan (2011a) 
1. Reference case   
Without current 
or new policies 
Base   
2. Business as Unusual, 
including 3 variants with 
no current demand, fiscal 
or technology policies 
 
With current 
policies 
Base   
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3. Reference case with 
high fossil fuel price 
 
Without current 
or new policies 
High   
4. Business as Unusual 
with high fossil fuel price 
 
With current 
policies 
High   
5. Reference case with 
CO2 reduction 
-80% 
Without current 
or new policies 
Base   
6. Business as unusual 
with CO2 reduction 
-80% 
With current 
policies 
Base   
7. Reference case with 
CO2 reduction 
-80% 
Without current 
or new policies 
High   
8. Business as unusual 
with CO2 reduction 
-80% 
With current 
policies 
High   
Strachan and 
Usher (2012) 
1. First best      
2. Infrastructure 
implementation 
   Limited build rates  
3. Behavioral change     
No elastic 
demand 
4. Resource availability    
No biomass and 
hydrogen import  
 
5. Technology innovation    
No new nuclear or 
CCS5 
 
6.  Infrastructure 
implementation and 
behavioral change 
   Limited build rates 
No elastic 
demand 
100 
 
100 
 
7.  Behavioral change and 
resource availability 
   
No biomass and 
hydrogen import 
No elastic 
demand 
8.  Infrastructure 
implementation, 
Behavioral change, 
Resource availability, 
Technology innovation 
   
No biomass and 
hydrogen import; 
No new nuclear or 
CCS5;  
Limited build rates 
No elastic 
demand 
Usher and 
Strachan (2012) 
1. Reference case None     
2. Low fossil fuel prices -80%  Low 
Without biomethane 
and CCS5 
 
3. Central fossil fuel prices -80%  Central 
Without biomethane 
and CCS5 
 
4.  High fossil fuel prices -80%  High 
Without biomethane 
and CCS5 
 
5.  Very high fossil fuel 
prices 
-80%  
Very 
high 
Without biomethane 
and CCS5 
 
6.  Low fossil fuel prices 
with novel mitigation 
options 
-80%  Low 
With biomethane and 
CCS5 
 
7.  Central fossil fuel 
prices with novel 
mitigation options 
-80%  Central 
With biomethane and 
CCS5 
 
8.  High fossil fuel prices 
with novel mitigation 
-80%  High 
With biomethane and 
CCS5 
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options 
9.  Very high fossil fuel 
prices with novel 
mitigation options 
-80%  
Very 
high 
With biomethane and 
CCS5 
 
10. Low biomass 
availability 
-90%   
Low biomass 
availability 
 
11. High biomass 
availability 
-90%   
High biomass 
availability 
 
Watson (2012) 1. On track    Viable CCS  
2. Momentum lost    
Viable until mid-
2020s 
 
3. Slow and sporadic    
Moderately viable to 
2030s 
 
4. Failure    No CCS deployment  
Winskel et al. 
(2009) 
1. Core -80%     
2. Non-accelerated 
scenario 
-80%   No acceleration  
3.. Accelerated in parallel -80%   
Multiple technologies 
accelerated 
 
4. Non-accelerated 
scenario 
-60%   No acceleration  
5. Accelerated in parallel -60%   
Multiple technologies 
accelerated 
 
6.  Accelerated in parallel, -80%   No acceleration; no  
102 
 
102 
 
no CCS5 CCS5 
4.4.1 7. Accelerated in 
parallel, delayed 
CCS5 
-80%   
No acceleration; 
delayed CCS5 
 
8.  Accelerated in parallel, 
no fuel cells 
-80%   
No acceleration; no 
fuel cells 
 
Winskel (2011)  1. Low carbon -80%     
2. Medium low carbon -60%     
3. Single accelerated 
technology development - 
wind 
-60%   
Technology 
acceleration for wind 
 
4. Single accelerated 
technology development - 
marine 
-60%   
Technology 
acceleration for 
marine 
 
5. Single accelerated 
technology development - 
solar 
-60%   
Technology 
acceleration for solar 
 
6. Single accelerated 
technology development - 
bio-energy 
-60%   
Technology 
acceleration for bio-
energy 
 
7. Single accelerated 
technology development - 
nuclear 
-60%   
Technology 
acceleration for 
nuclear 
 
8. Single accelerated -60%   Technology  
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technology development - 
CCS5 
acceleration for CCS5 
9. Single accelerated 
technology development - 
fuel cells 
-60%   
Technology 
acceleration for fuel 
cells 
 
10. Aggregated 
accelerated technology 
development for four 
renewable technologies 
-80%   
Technology 
acceleration for wind, 
marine, solar and 
bioenergy 
 
11. Aggregated 
accelerated technology 
development for seven low 
carbon technologies 
-80%   
Technology 
acceleration for wind, 
marine, solar, 
bioenergy, nuclear, 
CCS5 and fuel cells 
 
1 RO – Renewable Obligation 
2 RTO – Renewable Transport Obligation 
3 RHP – Renewable Heat Programme 
4  ETR – Environmental tax reform 
5 CCS – Carbon capture and storage  
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